Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation
  (Extended Version) by Awad, Edmond et al.
Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group
Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)
Edmond Awad1,2, Martin Caminada3, Gabriella Pigozzi4, Mikołaj Podlaszewski5, and Iyad Rahwan1,2,†
1The Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
2Masdar Institute, UAE
3School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, UK
4Universite´ Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS, UMR [7243], LAMSADE, 75016 Paris,
France
5University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
†Correspondence should be addressed to irahwan@mit.edu
Abstract
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat rela-
tion among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumen-
tation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of
multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to
ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality
and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual prefer-
ences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously
introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strat-
egy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental
trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical
logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship
between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an
appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well
as the nature of agents’ preferences.
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1 Introduction
Argumentation has recently become one of the main approaches for non-monotonic reasoning
and multi-agent interaction in artificial intelligence and computer science [4, 7, 41]. The most
prominent approach in argumentation models is probably the abstract argumentation framework
(AAF) by Dung [24]. In AAF, the contents of the arguments are abstracted from and the framework
can be represented as a directed graph in which nodes represent arguments (a set A), and arcs
between these nodes represent binary defeat relations (denoted as ⇀) over them.
An important question is which arguments to accept. In his seminal paper, Dung has defined
extension-based semantics which correspond to different criteria of acceptability of arguments. For
example, if we have two arguments that defeat each other, we cannot accept both. We may accept
only one of them. Another equivalent labeling-based semantics is proposed by Caminada [18, 14].
Using this approach, an argument is labeled in (i.e. accepted), out (i.e. rejected), or undec (i.e.
undecided).
One of the essential properties, that is common, is the condition of admissibility: that accepted
arguments must not attack one another, and must defend themselves against counter-arguments,
by attacking them back. A stronger notion is called completeness, and is captured, in terms of
labelings, in the following two conditions:
1. An argument is labeled accepted (or in) if and only if all its defeaters are rejected (or out).
2. An argument is labeled rejected (or out) if and only if at least one of its defeaters is accepted
(or in).
In all other cases, an argument should be labeled undecided (or undec). Thus, evaluating a set of
arguments amounts to labeling each argument using a labeling functionL : A→{in,out,undec}
to capture these three possible labels. Any labeling that satisfies the above conditions is a legal
labeling, and corresponds to a complete labeling (to be discussed in more detail below). Every
complete (i.e. legal) labeling represents a consistent self-defending point of view. We will use
legal labeling and complete labeling interchangably.
Since there can be different reasonable positions regarding the evaluation of an argumentation
graph, choosing one legal labeling above another is not a trivial task. Therefore, in a multi-agent
setting, different agents can subscribe to different positions. Hence, a group of agents with an
argumentation graph would need to find a collective labeling that best reflects the opinion of the
group. Consider the following example which is depicted in Figure 1.
Example 1 (A Murder Case). A murder case is under investigation. There is an argument that the
suspect is innocent, which suggests that he should be set free (A). However, there is some evidence
that the suspect was at the crime scene during the crime time, which suggests that the suspect is
not innocent (B). Weirdly enough, a witness confirmed that she saw someone who looks like the
suspect in a bar during the crime time, which suggests that the suspect is innocent (C).
Clearly, B and C defeat each other since they support negating conclusions. Also, B defeats A
since it provides enough evidence to nullify it.
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A team of four jurors has been assigned to decide on this case. They have been provided with
the previous information. Figure 1 shows the three possible legal labelings. Each juror’s judgment
can correspond to only one of these labelings. Suppose they voted as shown in Figure 1 (the four
thumbs-ups), what would be a labeling that best reflects the opinion of the team?
?
What would be a 
good collective 
labeling?
A: The suspect is 
innocent. Therefore, 
he should be set free.
B: The suspect was 
at the crime scene. 
Therefore, he is not 
innocent.
C: The suspect was 
in a bar. Therefore,
he is innocent.
2
3
Figure 1: Three different labelings with the votes on each labeling.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the problem, the aggregation of individual evaluations can re-
sult into an inconsistent group outcome i.e. even when each individual submits a legal labeling, the
aggregation outcome might not be a legal labeling. This problem of aggregating labelings can be
compared to preference aggregation (PA) [1, 2, 26, 45], judgment aggregation (JA) [33, 31, 32, 30],
and non-binary judgment aggregation [22, 23]. These areas have so far blossomed around impos-
sibility results. There exist many differences between labelings and preference relations stemming
from their corresponding order-theoretic characterizations. Labeling aggregation differ from JA
in that arguments (which are the counterparts of propositions) can have three values instead of
two traditionally considered in JA. Considering the general framework in [23], our settings can be
considered as focusing on special classes of feasible evaluations, which are the conditions imposed
by the legal labelling (or other semantics). Additionally, the possible evaluations of each issue (ar-
gument, in our case) are to accept (labels as in), reject (labels as out), or be undecided (labels as
undec). However, translation of results between labeling aggregation and non-binary JA amounts
to encoding argument semantics in propositional logic, which is not a trivial task [5, 6].
Recently, the problem of aggregating valid labelings has been the topic of some studies [42, 3,
15, 9, 11]. In [42, 3], the argument-wise plurality rule (AWPR) which chooses the collective label
of each argument by plurality, independently from other arguments, was defined and analyzed. On
the other hand, Caminada and Pigozzi [15] showed how judgment aggregation concepts can be
applied to formal argumentation in a different way. They proposed three possible operators for ag-
gregating labelings, namely the skeptical operator, the credulous operator, and the super credulous
operator. These operators guarantee not only a well-formed outcome but also a compatible one,
that is, it does not go against the judgment of any individual.
In order to assess the three operators, we assume that individuals have preferences over the out-
comes. Although the outcomes of the three aggregation operators proposed in [15] are compatible
3
with every individual’s labeling, this does not mean that they are the most desirable given individ-
uals’ preferences. It is possible that other compatible labelings are more desirable. Moreover, it
is possible that some agents submit an insincere opinion in order to get more desirable outcomes.
Given that, it is interesting to study the following two questions:
1. Are the social outcomes of the aggregation operators in [15] Pareto optimal if preferences
between different outcomes are also taken into consideration?
2. How robust are these operators against strategic manipulation? And what are the effects of
strategic manipulation from the perspective of social welfare?
The first question studies the Pareto optimality of the outcomes of these operators. A Pareto
optimal outcome (given individuals preferences) cannot be replaced with another outcome that is
more preferred by all individuals and is strictly more preferred by at least one individual. Pareto
optimality is a fundamental concept in any social choice setting and a clearly desirable property
for any aggregation operator.
The second question studies the strategy proofness of the operators. Strategy proofness is
fundamental in any realistic multi-agent setting. A strategy-proof operator is one that produces
outcomes where individuals have no incentive to misrepresent their votes (i.e. to lie). Unfortu-
nately, as we will see later, most strategy proofness results for the three operators are negative.
However, we show later that lies do not always have bad effects on other agents.
One can realize that individuals’ preferences (over all the labelings) play a vital role in answer-
ing the previous two questions. However, aggregation operators usually do not give the chance for
individuals to disclose these preferences. The labeling an agent submits is the only information
available about agent’s preferences. It seems a natural choice to assume that the submitted labeling
is the most preferred one according to agents’ individual preference. Moreover we assume that the
rest of agent’s preferences can be modeled using distance from the most preferred one. For exam-
ple, if the top preferred outcome for agent i is the outcome O1 (i.e. ∀O j, O1 i O j), then O2 i O3
iff dist(O1,O2) < dist(O1,O3) where dist(O1,O2) is the distance between the two outcomes O1
and O2.
In this work, we investigate different classes of preferences based on different distance mea-
sures, and use them to analyze the three aggregation operators proposed in [15] with respect to the
aforementioned two questions.
This paper makes three distinct contributions. First, it introduces the first thorough study of
Pareto optimality and strategy proofness for aggregation operators in the context of argumentation.
In doing so, the paper highlights that considering argumentation in multi-agent conflict resolution
calls for criteria other than logical consistency such as social optimality and strategic manipulation.
Second, the paper introduces different families of agents’ preferences. Building on the new
concept of issue, proposed by Booth et al. [10], we define a new class of agents preferences. We
also define a new class of preferences which consider the label undec as a middle label between in
and out. These new families of preferences capture the intuitions, are more natural, and broaden
the scope of analysis of preferences.
The third contribution of this paper is establishing relations between the different classes of
preferences. Some of these relations hold for any aggregation operator and others for some special
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aggregation operators. Additionally, we provide a full comparison for three previously introduced
labeling aggregation operators with respect to the proposed classes of preferences. Moreover, we
also consider cases where agents do not share the same classes of preference. Our results are based
on two fundamental criteria, namely Pareto optimality and strategy proofness. For most classes of
preferences we establish the superiority of the skeptical operator. However, we also characterize
situations where the credulous and super credulous operators are as good as the skeptical operator.
This highlights a trade-off between the two criteria on one hand, and seeking more committed
outcomes on the other hand.
Our results bridge a gap in our understanding of the social optimality and strategic manipulation
of labeling aggregation operators. As for the Pareto optimality, we show the persistence of the
superiority of the skeptical operator. However, there are situations where the credulous and super
credulous operators are as good as the skeptical operator. This has an implication on the choice of
the appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that is considered more important, as well
as, the nature of agents preferences.
As for the strategy proofness, we establish the fragility of the three operators against strategic
manipulation. This negative result is consistent even for a wide range of individual agent prefer-
ence criteria (except for two cases). This highlights a major limitation of these otherwise attractive
approaches to collective argument evaluation.
Despite the negative results, our results show that lies with the skeptical operator are always
benevolent i.e. every strategic lie by an agent does not hurt others, but rather improves their wel-
fare. Furthermore, we show that this effect is surprisingly consistent for a wide range of individual
agent preference criteria. This shows an important advantage for such an approach to labeling
aggregation.1
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Abstract Argumentation Framework (AAF).2
The seminal paper by Dung [24] introduced the fundamental notion of abstract argumentation
framework that can be represented as a directed graph where the vertices represent arguments
(ignoring details about their contents) and the directed arcs represent the defeat relations between
these arguments.3 For example, in Figure 2, argument A1 is defeated by arguments A2 and A4
which are, in turn, defeated by arguments A3 and A5.
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework [24]). An argumentation framework is a pairAF= 〈A,⇀
〉 whereA is a finite set of arguments and ⇀⊆A×A is a defeat relation. We say that an argument
A defeats an argument B if (A,B) ∈⇀ (sometimes written A ⇀ B).
There are two approaches to define semantics that assess the acceptability of arguments. One
of them is extension-based semantics by Dung [24], which produces a set of arguments that are
1Part of the results of this paper have been presented in [16].
2Readers familiar with AAF can skip this part.
3We will use “argumentation graph” and “argumentation framework” interchangeably.
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Figure 2: A simple argumentation graph
accepted together. Another equivalent labeling-based semantics is proposed by Caminada [18, 14],
which gives a labeling for each argument. With argument labelings, we can accept arguments
(by labeling them as in), reject arguments (by labeling them as out), and abstain from deciding
whether to accept or reject (by labeling them as undec). As [15] employed the labeling approach,
so we continue to use it here.
Definition 2 (Argument labeling [18, 14]). Let AF= 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. An
argument labeling is a total function L :A→{in,out,undec}.
For the purposes of this paper, we use the following marking convention, as shown in Figure 3,
arguments labeled in are shown in white, out in black, and undec in gray.
Figure 3: A labeling of an argumentation graph.
We write in(L) for the set of arguments that are labeled in by L, out(L) for the set of argu-
ments that are labeled out by L, and undec(L) for the set of arguments that are labeled undec
by L. A labeling L can be represented as L = (in(L),out(L),undec(L)). Equivalently, we also
denote a labeling L as: L= {(A, l)| L(A) = l for all A ∈A, l ∈ {in,out,undec}}.
However, labelings should follow some given conditions. If an argument is labeled in then all
of its defeaters are labeled out. If an argument is labeled out then at least one of its defeaters is
labeled in. We call a labeling that follows the previous two conditions an admissible labeling.
Definition 3 (Admissible labeling [18, 14]). Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework.
An admissible labeling is a mapping L : A→ {in,out,undec} such that for each A ∈ A it holds
that:
if L(A) = in then ∀B∈A : (B ⇀ A⇒ L(B) = out), and
if L(A) = out then ∃B∈A : (B ⇀ A ∧ L(B) = in).
Some examples for admissible labelings, in Figure 2, can include the following: ({A1,A3,A5},
{A2,A4}, /0), ({A3,A5}, {A2,A4}, {A1}), ({A3}, {A2}, {A1,A4,A5}), ({A5}, /0, {A1,A2,A3,A4}),
and ( /0, /0, {A1,A2,A3,A4,A5}).
One can realize that in an admissible labeling, unlike in-labeled and out-labeled arguments,
undec-labels do not need to be justified i.e. an argument can be labeled undec under an admissible
labeling without any condition.
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The complete semantics, however, force undec-labels to be also justified. A complete labeling
is an admissible labeling with the following extra condition: If an argument is labeled undec then
there is no defeating argument that is labeled in (that is, there is insufficient ground to label the
argument out) and not all defeating arguments are labeled out (that is, there is insufficient ground
to label the argument in). We call a labeling which follows these rules a complete labeling.
Definition 4 (Complete labeling [18, 14]). Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. A
complete labeling is a mapping L :A→{in,out,undec} such that for each A ∈A it holds that:
if L(A) = in then ∀B∈A : (B ⇀ A⇒ L(B) = out),
if L(A) = out then ∃B∈A : (B ⇀ A ∧ L(B) = in), and
if L(A) = undec then:
¬[∀B∈A : (B ⇀ A⇒ L(B) = out)]∧¬[∃B∈A : (B ⇀ A ∧ L(B) = in)]
As an example for a complete labeling, in Figure 2, we have only one complete labeling, namely
({A1,A3,A5}, {A2,A4}, /0).
2.2 Aggregation Operators
Perhaps, the most common aggregation rules are the majority rules, in which an alternative is
chosen if and only if it receives a number of votes that exceeds some presepecified threshold
k > 0.5×N, where N is the number of voters. However, these rules are not always appropriate.
One example is in juries, when the legal or the moral responsibility of the outcome is shared by
all individuals. Indeed Ronnegard [43] argued that the attribution of moral responsibility to all
members of a committee is legitimate when the decision is taken through unanimous voting, while
it is not necessarily the case otherwise. Another example is when the outcome of the decision can
potentially harm some individuals. It was shown in [8] that people show a preference for more
conservative aggregation procedures when the outcome of the decision may involve the infliction
of personal harm. Aiming to address such specific scenarios, Caminada and Pigozzi [15] proposed
three aggregation rules that ensure the compatibility of the outcome with all individuals votes.
Before introducing the aggregation operators that were defined in [15], we first define the prob-
lem of aggregation. The problem of labeling aggregation can be formulated as a set of individuals
that collectively decide how an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉 must be labelled.
Definition 5 (Labeling aggregation problem [3]). Let Ag = {1, . . . ,n} be a finite non-empty set of
agents, and AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. A labeling aggregation problem is a
pair LAP= 〈Ag,AF〉.
Each individual i ∈ Ag has a labeling Li which expresses the evaluation of AF by this individ-
ual. A labeling profile P is a set of the labelings submitted by agents in Ag: P = {L1, . . . ,Ln}.4
4We follow [15] in assuming that the profile is a set of labelings instead of a list of labelings. Although this is not
common in judgment aggregation literature where the number of votes matter in many operators, it is not the case for
the three operators considered in this study, since they focus on compatibility instead of cardinality. As such, although
we list n labelings in the profile, it is possible that a profile has less than n elements, since agents can submit similar
labelings.
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A labeling aggregation operator is a function that maps a set of n labelings, chosen from the set
of all labelings, Labs, into a collective labeling.5
Definition 6 (Labeling aggregation operator OAF [15]). Let LAP= 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggre-
gation problem. A labeling aggregation operator for LAP is a function OAF : 2Labs \{ /0}→ Labs
such that OAF({L1, . . . ,Ln}) = LColl , where LColl is the collective labeling.
A labeling L1 is said to be less or equally committed than another labeling L2 if and only if
every argument that is labeled in by L1 is also labeled in by L2 and every argument that is labeled
out by L1 is also labeled out by L2.
Definition 7 (Less or equally committed v [15]). Let L1 and L2 be two labelings of argumenta-
tion framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We say that L1 is less or equally committed as L2 (L1 v L2) iff
(in(L1)⊆ in(L2))∧ (out(L1)⊆ out(L2)).
Two labelings L1 and L2 are said to be compatible with each other if and only if for every
argument, there is no in− out conflict between the two. In other words, every argument that is
labeled in by L1 is not labeled out by L2 and every argument that is labeled out by L1 is not
labeled in by L2.
Definition 8 (Compatible labelings ≈ [15]). Let L1 and L2 be two labelings of argumentation
frameworkAF= 〈A,⇀〉. We say thatL1 is compatible withL2 (L1≈L2) iff (in(L1)∩out(L2)=
/0)∧ (out(L1)∩in(L2) = /0)
We now define a compatible operator as the following:
Definition 9 (Compatible operator). Let LAP= 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggregation problem, and
let OAF be a labeling aggregation operator for LAP. We say OAF is a compatible operator if
given any labeling profile P = {L1, . . . ,Ln}, OAF(P) ≈ Li,∀i ∈ Ag i.e. the outcome of OAF is
compatible with each individual’s labeling.
In [15], Caminada and Pigozzi proposed three different aggregation operators, namely the skep-
tical operator, the credulous operator and the super credulous operator. Each of these operators
maps a set of labelings, that are submitted by individuals, into a collective labeling. The following
two definitions are used in the definition of these operators:
Definition 10 (Initial operators u, unionsq [15]). Let LAP= 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggregation prob-
lem. The skeptical initial u and credulous initial unionsq operators are labeling aggregation operators
for LAP defined as the following:
• u({L1, . . . ,Ln}) = {(A,in)|∀i ∈ Ag : Li(A) = in} ∪ {(A,out)|∀i ∈ Ag : Li(A) = out} ∪
{(A,undec)|∃i ∈ Ag : Li(A) 6= in∧∃ j ∈ Ag : L j(A) 6= out}
5Although it would be more precise to use LabsSAF to denote the set of all labelings forAF= 〈A,⇀〉 according to
semantics S, we will often drop AF and S, and use Labs instead when there is no ambiguity about the argumentation
framework. The same goes for all other notations (e.g. OAF) that were defined for anAF, when there is no ambiguity
about the argumentation framework.
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• unionsq({L1, . . . ,Ln})= {(A,in)|∃i∈Ag :Li(A)= in∧¬∃ j∈Ag :L j(A)= out} ∪ {(A,out)|∃i∈
Ag :Li(A) = out∧¬∃ j ∈ Ag :L j(A) = in} ∪ {(A,undec)|∀i ∈ Ag :Li(A) = undec∨ (∃ j ∈
Ag : L j(A) = in∧∃k ∈ Ag : Lk(A) = out)} 6
Definition 11 (Down-admissible ↓ and up-complete ↑ labelings [15]). Let L be a labeling of ar-
gumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉. The down-admissible labeling of L, denoted as L↓, is the
biggest element of the set of all admissible labelings that are less or equally committed than L:
∀L′ ∈ Adms : (L′ v L⇒ L′ v (L ↓)v L)
where Adms is the set of all admissible labelings forAF. The up-complete labeling ofL, denoted as
L↑, is the smallest element of the set of all complete labelings that are bigger or equally committed
than L.
∀L′ ∈ Comps : (Lv L′⇒ Lv (L ↑)v L′)
Now, we provide the definitions of the three operators:
Definition 12 (Skeptical soAF, Credulous coAF and Super Credulous scoAF operators [15]). Let
LAP = 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggregation problem. The skeptical soAF, the credulous coAF
and super credulous scoAF operators are labeling aggregation operators for LAP defined as the
following:
• soAF({L1, . . . ,Ln}) = (u({L1, . . . ,Ln})) ↓.
• coAF({L1, . . . ,Ln}) = (unionsq({L1, . . . ,Ln})) ↓.
• scoAF({L1, . . . ,Ln}) = ((unionsq({L1, . . . ,Ln})) ↓) ↑.
Given the set of all admissible labelings Adms for some argumentation framework, it is shown
that the outcome of the skeptical aggregation operator is the biggest element in Adms that is less or
equally committed to every individual’s labeling.
Theorem 1 ([15]). Let L1, . . . ,Ln (n≥ 1) be labelings of argumentation frameworkAF= 〈A,⇀〉.
Let LSO be soAF({L1, . . . ,Ln}). It holds that LSO is the biggest admissible labeling such that for
every i ∈ Ag : LSO v Li.
2.3 Distance Measures
In this part, we define the family of distance measures that we use to define preferences. Each of
the distance measures we consider is characterized by three choices:
• Individual arguments vs. Issues (set of arguments).
• Set inclusion vs. Quantitative distance.
• Uniform vs. undec in the middle.
6We will often use sioAF and cioAF to refer to the skeptical initial and credulous initial operators, respectively.
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The combination of all of these choices produces eight different distance measures. We start from
the third choice. The uniform vs. undec in the middle choice captures the intuition that the distance
between accepting an argument (in) and rejecting it (out) may be set as equal or superior to the
distance of accepting (or rejecting) an argument (in or out) and abstaining on the same argument
(undec). In other words, an in/out disagreement may be as serious or more serious (depending
on the contexts) than a in/undec (or a out/undec) disagreement.
Thus, we consider the following two cases. First, in, out, and undec are equally distant
from each other. In other words, dist(in,out) = dist(dec,undec), where dist(.) is the difference
between two labels for one argument, and dec is either in or out. In the other case, we assume
that undec is in the middle between in and out. Thus, we differentiate between two types of
disagreement. One between in and out, and the other between dec and undec. When considering
distance, we assume dist(in,out)> dist(dec,undec).
2.3.1 Case 1: in, out, and undec are Equally Distant from Each Other
Hamming Set and Hamming Distance
The Hamming set between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of arguments that these two labelings
disagree upon.
Definition 13 (Hamming Set ). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We define the
Hamming set between these two labelings as:
L1L2 = {A ∈A|L1(A) 6= L2(A)} (1)
The Hamming distance between two labelingsL1 and L2 is the number of arguments that these
two labelings disagree upon.
Definition 14 (Hamming Distance ||). Let L1 and L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We
define the Hamming distance between these two labelings as:
L1 ||L2 = |L1L2| (2)
Issue-wise Set and Issue-wise Distance.
The label of an argument depends on the labels of the defeating arguments. Therefore, measuring
the distance by treating arguments independently might not give an accurate sense of how far two
labelings are from each other. Consider the example in Figure 4. Using Hamming distance, we
have L1 ||L2 = L1 ||L3 = 4.
However, one can argue that L3 is closer (than L2) to L1. Intuitively speaking, if L1 and L3
further agreed on the labeling of C (or D), then they would have been equivalent. On the other
hand, L1 and L2 should further agree on E (or F) and G (or H) in order to become equivalent. In
other words, the number of arguments whose labelings need to be switched in order to make the
two labelings be equivalent is less between L1 and L3 than between L1 and L2.
Motivated by this example, Booth et al. [10] proposed a new distance method, using the notion
of “issue”, which they defined. This distance method captures the idea in the previous example,
10
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Figure 4: An example showing how Hamming distance is not a suitable distance measure for
argument labeling [10].
while satisfying a set of axiomatic properties which they listed as essential for any distance mea-
sure.
Crucial to the definition of the “issue” is the concept of “in-sync”. We say that two arguments
A and B are in-sync if for any pair of labelings L,L′ ∈ Labs, L(A) cannot be changed to L′(A)
without causing a change of equal magnitude when moving from L(B) to L′(B), and vice versa.
Definition 15 (in-Sync ≡ for semantics S [10]). Let LabsS be the set of all labelings according to
semantics S for argumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We say that two arguments A,B ∈A are
in-sync for semantics S (A≡S B):
A≡S B iff (A≡S1 B ∨ A≡S2 B) (3)
where:
• A≡S1 B iff ∀L ∈ LabsS : L(A) = L(B).
• A≡S2 B iff ∀L ∈ LabsS : (L(A) = in⇔ L(B) = out) ∧ (L(A) = out⇔ L(B) = in)
In-sync is an equivalence relation. We can partition the set of arguments in any argumentation
framework AF into the in-sync equivalence classes, which form what is called issues.7
Definition 16 (Issue [10]). Given the argumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉, a set of arguments
B⊆A is called an issue iff it forms an equivalence class of the relation in-Sync (≡).
The Issue-wise set between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of issues that these two labelings
disagree upon.
Definition 17 (Issue-wise Set W). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉 and let I be the
set of all issues in AF. We define the Issue-wise set between these two labelings as:
L1WL2 = {B ∈ I|L1(A) 6= L2(A) for some (equiv. all) A ∈B} (4)
7The definition of issue, along with all the definitions depending on it, can be defined for semantics S (as the case
for “in-sync”). However, from now on, we will restrict all of these definitions to the complete semantics, and drop the
letter S. Thus, “issues” in what follows refers to the equivalnce classes of in-sync for the complete semantics.
11
Note that the sentence “for some (equiv. all)” follows from the definition of issues. One can
realize that:
∀L1,L2 ∈ Labs,∀B ∈ I : (∃A ∈B s.t. L1(A) 6= L2(A)⇔∀A ∈B : L1(A) 6= L2(A)) (5)
The Issue-wise distance between two labelings L1 and L2 is the number of issues that these
two labelings disagree upon.
Definition 18 (Issue-wise Distance |W|). LetL1, L2 be two labelings ofAF= 〈A,⇀〉. We define
the Issue-wise distance between these two labelings as:
L1 |W|L2 = |L1WL2| (6)
For example, in Figure 4, the Issue-wise sets between L1 and the other two labellings are:
L1WL2 = {{E,F},{G,H}}
L1WL3 = {{A,B,C,D}}
While the corresponding Issue-wise distances are:
L1 |W|L2 = |{{E,F},{G,H}}|= 2
L1 |W|L3 = |{{A,B,C,D}}|= 1
2.3.2 Case 2: undec is in the Middle between in and out
In this section, we consider the case where undec is in the middle between in and out. Thus,
we differentiate between two types of disagreement: 1) in/out disagreement, and 2) dec/undec
disagreement. When considering distance, we assume dist(in,out) = 2× dist(dec,undec) = 2.
8
To illustrate the difference from the previous case, consider the example shown in Figure 5.
In this example, one can realize that the labelings L2 and L3 are equally distant from labeling L1
when considering Hamming set/distance or Issue-wise set/distance.
However, one can argue that L3 is closer than L2 to L1. Consider the arguments in Figure 5.
Labelings L1 and L2 seem to be on completely different sides regarding their evaluations for A and
B. On the other hand, the difference between L1 and L3 is less drastic, because L3 abstains from
taking any position about A and B.
We use IUO (short for In-Undec-Out i.e. Undec is in the middle) to denote this class of prefer-
ences.
8 The use of 2 here is chosen carefully to satisfy the triangle inequality. However, the use of any α s.t. 1 < α ≤ 2
would not affect the results of this paper. We just use 2 here for simplicity.
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3A: John is guilty.
B: John is not guilty.
Figure 5: An example showing the need for considering undec as a middle labeling between in
and out.
IUO Hamming Sets and IUO Hamming Distance
The in− out Hamming set (io) between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of arguments that
both labelings label as decided (i.e. in or out), but on which they disagree upon. The dec−undec
Hamming set (du) between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of arguments that one of the two
labelings labels as decided (whether in or out) and the other labels as undecided.
Definition 19 (IUO Hamming sets M). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We define
the IUO Hamming sets as a pair M = (io,du), where io is in−out Hamming set and du
is dec−undec Hamming set:
L1ioL2 = {A ∈A|(L1(A) = in∧L2(A) = out)∨
(L1(A) = out∧L2(A) = in)} (7)
L1duL2 = {A ∈A|(A ∈ dec(L1)∧L2(A) = undec)∨
(L1(A) = undec∧A ∈ dec(L2))} (8)
where dec(L1) is the set of decided (in or out) arguments according to the labeling L1.
The IUO Hamming distance between two labelings L1 and L2 is the number of arguments in
L1duL2 added to twice the number of the arguments in L1ioL2.
Definition 20 (IUO Hamming Distance
∣∣M∣∣). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We
define the IUO Hamming distance between these two labelings as:
L1
∣∣∣M∣∣∣L2 = 2×|L1ioL2|+ |L1duL2| (9)
IUO Issue-wise Sets and IUO Issue-wise Distance
The in−out Issue-wise set (ioW) between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of issues that both of
the two labelings label as decided, but on which they disagree upon. The dec−undec Issue-wise
set (duW) between two labelings L1 and L2 is the set of issues that one of the two labelings labels
as decided and the other labels as undecided.
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Definition 21 (IUO Issue-wise sets MW). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉 and let I
be the set of all issues in AF. We define the IUO Issue-wise sets as MW = (ioW,duW), where ioW
is the in−out Issue-wise set and duW is the dec−undec Issue-wise set:
L1ioWL2 = {B ∈ I|(L1(A) = in∧L2(A) = out)∨
(L1(A) = out∧L2(A) = in) for some (equiv. all) A ∈B} (10)
L1duW L2 = {B ∈ I|(A ∈ dec(L1)∧L2(A) = undec)∨
(L1(A) = undec∧A ∈ dec(L2)) for some (equiv. all) A ∈B} (11)
Note that given the definition of issues, for every labeling L, an issue is either decided (all
arguments in it are labeled in or out by L) or undecided (all arguments in it are labeled undecided
by L):
∀L ∈ Labs,∀B ∈ I : (∃A ∈B s.t. A ∈ dec(L)⇔∀A ∈B : A ∈ dec(L)) (12)
The IUO Issue-wise distance between two labelings L1 and L2 is the number of issues in
L1duW L2 added to twice the number of the issues in L1ioWL2.
Definition 22 (IUO Issue-wise Distance
∣∣MW∣∣). Let L1, L2 be two labelings of AF = 〈A,⇀〉. We
define the IUO Issue-wise distance between these two labelings as:
L1
∣∣∣MW∣∣∣L2 = 2×|L1ioWL2|+ |L1duW L2| (13)
For example, in Figure 5, the IUO Issue-wise sets between L1 and the other two labellings are:
L1ioWL2 = {{A,B}},L1duW L2 = {}
L1ioWL3 = {},L1duW L3 = {{A,B}}
While the corresponding IUO Issue-wise distances are:
L1
∣∣∣MW∣∣∣L2 = 2×|{{A,B}}|+0 = 2
L1
∣∣∣MW∣∣∣L3 = 2×0+ |{{A,B}}|= 1
Table 1 summarizes the distance measures we consider.
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Uniform IUO
Hamming Set Hamming Set  IUO Hamming Sets MDistance Hamming Distance || IUO Hamming Distance ∣∣M∣∣
Issue-wise Set Issue-wise Set W IUO Issue-wise Sets MWDistance Issue-wise Distance |W| IUO Issue-wise Distance ∣∣MW∣∣
Table 1: Full family of distance measures.
2.4 Preferences
Given the distance measures defined earlier, we define agents’ preferences. We say an agent’s
preferences are x-based, if her preferences are calculated using the distance measure x (e.g. Ham-
ming distance based preferences). We use i,x to denote a weak preference relation by agent i
whose preferences are x-based i.e. for any pair L1,L2 ∈ Labs, L1 i,x L2 denotes that L1 is more
or equally preferred than L2 by agent i with x-based preferences. Further, we use i,x to denote a
strict preference relation (L1 i,x L2 iff (L1 i,x L2)∧¬(L2 i,x L1)), ∼ to denote an incompa-
rability relation (L1 ∼i,x L2 iff ¬(L1 i,x L2)∧¬(L2 i,x L1)), and ∼= to denote an indifference
relation (L1 ∼=i,x L2 iff (L1 i,x L2)∧ (L2 i,x L1)).
We define the subset relation over pairs of sets as the following.
Definition 23 (Subset Over Pairs ⊆). Let A1,A2,B1,B2 be four sets, and Let S1 = (A1,B1), S2 =
(A2,B2) be two pairs of sets. We use S1 ⊆ S2 to denote the subset relation over pairs of subsets:
S1 ⊆ S2 iff A1 ⊆ A2∧B1 ⊆ B2 (14)
Given a set measure ⊗∈ {,M,W,MW}, an agent i, who has ⊗-set based preferences (and
whose top preference is Li), would prefer a labelling L over another labeling L′ if and only if
the set of arguments in Li⊗L is a subset of Li⊗L′ (where “subset” here refers to the standard
definition of subset as well as the definition of “subset over pairs” defined above). Note that the set
based preference yields a partial order over the labelings.9
Definition 24 (Set Based Preferencei,⊗). We say that agent i’s preferences are⊗-set based w.r.t
Li iff:
∀L,L′ ∈ Labs : Li,⊗ L′⇔ L⊗Li ⊆ L′⊗Li (15)
where Li is agent i’s most preferred labeling and ⊗ ∈ {,M,W,MW}. Note that ⊗-set based
preferences is read Hamming set based preferences when⊗=, Issue-wise set based preferences
when ⊗=W, . . .etc.
Given a distance measure |⊗| ∈ {|| , ∣∣M∣∣ , |W| , ∣∣MW∣∣}, an agent i, who has |⊗|-distance
based preferences (and whose top preference is Li), would prefer a labelling L over another label-
ing L′ if and only if Li |⊗|L is less than Li |⊗|L′. Note that the distance based preference yields
a total pre-order over the labelings.
9Although formally, the set-based criteria are not measures but mappings to sets, we will slightly abuse terminology
and refer to all criteria (set based and distance based) as set and distance measures for easy reference.
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We now define the classes of preferences which are based on different distance measures, that
we defined earlier.
Definition 25 (Distance Based Preference i,|⊗|). We say that agent i’s preferences are |⊗|-
distance based w.r.t Li iff:
∀L,L′ ∈ Labs : Li,|⊗| L′⇔ L |⊗|Li ≤ L′ |⊗|Li (16)
where Li is agent i’s most preferred labeling and |⊗| ∈ {|| , ∣∣M∣∣ , |W| , ∣∣MW∣∣}. Note that |⊗|-
distance based preferences is read Hamming distance based preferences when |⊗| = ||, Issue-
wise distance based preferences when |⊗|= |W|, . . .etc.
To illustrate the set and distance based preferences, we use Hamming set and Hamming dis-
tance based preferences for their simplicity. Consider the example in Figure 6 with four possible
complete labelings. The Hamming sets between L1 and the other three labelings are:
L1L2 = {A,B}
L1L3 = {C,D,E}
L1L4 = {A,B,C,D,E}
Consequently, the Hamming distance values between L1 and the other three labelings are the
cardinality values of the Hamming sets between L1 and the other three labelings.
L1 ||L2 = |{A,B}|= 2
L1 ||L3 = |{C,D,E}|= 3
L1 ||L4 = |{A,B,C,D,E}|= 5
Assume we have agents with Hamming set based preferences. Hence, an arbitrary agent i
who prefers L1 the most, would have the following preferences: L1  L2  L4 and L1  L3  L4
(neither L1 L2 nor L1 L3 is a subset of the other). However, if agents have Hamming distance
based preferences, an agent who prefers L1 the most, would have the following preferences: L1 
L2  L3  L4.
We can now examine the examples in Figure 4 and 5 in the light of preferences. The example
in Figure 4 shows how an agent i whose top preference is Li = L1 would have different opinions
about other labelings given the different distance measures used. If agent i has Hamming distance
based preferences, then:
L1 ||L2 = |{E,F,G,H}|= 4
L1 ||L3 = |{A,B,C,D}|= 4
then, her preferences would be L1 i,|| L2 ∼=i,|| L3, while if she has Issue-wise distance based
preferences, then:
L1 |W|L2 = |{{E,F},{G,H}}|= 2
L1 |W|L3 = |{{A,B,C,D}}|= 1
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Figure 6: An argumentation graph with four possible complete labelings.
then, her preferences would be L1 i,|W| L3 i,|W| L2. Hence, it is interesting to introduce the
“Issue-wise” concept to define a new class of preferences.
The example in Figure 5 shows how an agent i (whose top preference is L1) would have differ-
ent preferences depending on whether in, out, and undec are equally distant, or undec is in the
middle between in and out. In the former case:
L1 ||L2 = |{A,B}|= 2
L1 ||L3 = |{A,B}|= 2
and
L1 |W|L2 = |{{A,B}}|= 1
L1 |W|L3 = |{{A,B}}|= 1
hence, L1 i,|| L2 ∼=i,|| L3 and L1 i,|W| L2 ∼=i,|W| L3. In the latter case:
L1
∣∣∣M∣∣∣L2 = 2×|{A,B}|+0 = 4
L1
∣∣∣M∣∣∣L3 = 2×0+ |{A,B}|= 2
and
L1
∣∣∣MW∣∣∣L2 = 2×|{{A,B}}|+0 = 2
L1
∣∣∣MW∣∣∣L3 = 2×0+ |{{A,B}}|= 1
hence, L1 i,|M| L3 i,|M| L2 and L1 i,|MW| L3 i,|MW| L2. Thus, it is interesting to
define Hamming and Issue based preferences with undec as a middle labeling.
3 Pareto Optimality
In this section, we study the Pareto optimality of the outcomes of the three operators given different
variations of the preferences. Pareto optimality is one of the fundamental concepts that ensures
that, given a profile, the social outcome selected by the aggregation procedure cannot be improved.
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A labeling L1 Pareto dominates L2 if and only if for any agent i, i would prefer L1 at least as
much as she prefers L2, and for at least one agent j, j would strictly prefer L1 over L2.
Definition 26 (Pareto dominance). Let Ag = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of agents with preferences i,
i ∈ Ag. L Pareto dominates L′ iff ∀i ∈ Ag, Li L′ and ∃ j ∈ Ag, L j L′.
A labeling is Pareto optimal in a set, if it is not Pareto dominated by any other labeling from
that set.
Definition 27 (Pareto optimality of a labeling in S). Let S be a set of labelings. A labeling L is
Pareto optimal in S if there is no labeling L′ ∈ S such that L′ Pareto dominates L.
In our results, the set S will mainly refer to a set of admissible (or complete) labelings that are
compatible with (or smaller or equal to) each of the participants’ labelings. Moreover, whenever
we refer to an operator as Pareto optimal (in a set S) we mean that it only produces Pareto optimal
outcomes (in S).
Definition 28 (Pareto optimality of an operator in S). Let S be a set of labelings. An operator is
Pareto optimal in S if it only produces Pareto optimal (in S) outcomes.
3.1 Connections between Classes of Preferences
3.1.1 General Connections
We start our analysis by noticing that some of the defined types are in fact equivalent. Consider
the following lemma which establishes the equivalence between some types of preferences:
Lemma 1. Issue-wise set based preferences coincide with Hamming set based preferences, and
IUO Issue-wise sets based preferences coincide with IUO Hamming sets based preferences.
Further, we notice that Pareto optimality carries over from each of the distance-based prefer-
ences to its corresponding set-based preferences.
Theorem 2. Let ⊗ ∈ {	,	M,	W,	MW} be a set measure and |⊗ | be its corresponding distance
measure (i.e. if⊗=	M then |⊗|= |	M |). If a labeling10 is Pareto optimal in a set S given agents
with |⊗ |-based preferences, then it is Pareto optimal in S given agents with ⊗-based preferences.
Unfortunately, these connections are only one-way. A counterexample for the opposite way is
provided in the Appendix.
10Note that since an operator is Pareto optimal in a set if and only if all of its outcomes are Pareto optimal in that
set, then one can see that in this theorem, and others as well, ‘labeling’ can be substituted with ‘operator’.
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3.1.2 Connections in Special Contexts
The implications shown in the previous part hold without restrictions. However, when all labelings
in S are admissible labelings and are compatible (≈) with each of the individuals’ labelings, one
can find further connections.
Theorem 3. Let X be the set of all admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the
participants’ individual labelings. Let S be any arbitrary set such that S ⊆ X. A labeling from S
is Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are Hamming set (resp. distance) based iff it is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets (resp. distance) based.
Theorem 4. Let X be the set of all admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the
participants’ individual labelings. Let S be any arbitrary set such that S⊆X. A labeling from S is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are Issue-wise set (resp. distance) based iff it is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise sets (resp. distance) based.
Note that unlike in the previous part where connections are one-way (from distance based to
set based, but not vice versa), the connections in this part hold in both directions.
3.1.3 Failed Connections
Given the findings so far, one might wonder about the existence of other connections among the
eight classes of preferences. Unfortunately, other than the ones found above, there exists no con-
nection, even after considering further restrictions, similar to the ones in the previous part. In the
Appendix, we provide counterexamples for the connections that do not hold between the classes
of preferences.
Basically, we provide an example for an argumentation framework in which Pareto optimal-
ity is satisfied when agents’ preferences are Hamming set based, Issue-wise set based, Issue-wise
distance based, IUO Hamming set based, IUO Issue-wise set based, and IUO Issue-wise distance
based. However, Pareto optimality is not satisfied when agents’ preferences are Hamming distance
based, or IUO Hamming distance based. This shows that Pareto optimality given Hamming dis-
tance based preferences and IUO Hamming distance based preferences cannot be inferred from the
other six classes of preferences.
In a similar way, we provide an example for an argumentation framework which shows that
Pareto optimality given Issue-wise distance based preferences and IUO Issue-wise distance based
preferences cannot be inferred from the other six classes of preferences.
We summarize all the findings in Table 2. For each cell in the table, a Y means that for any
operator, Pareto optimality in any arbitrary set S carries over from the preference class in the row
to the preference class in the column (in the same set S), while a Y ∗ means that it only holds for
compatible operators (i.e. that produce compatible outcomes).
Now we turn to studying the Pareto optimality of the three operators: the skeptical, the credu-
lous and the super credulous, with respect to the eight classes of preferences.
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HS/IwS HD IwD IUO IUO IUOHS/IwS HD IwD
Hamming set (HS) Y N N Y* N N
Issue-wise set (IwS)
Hamming dist. (HD) Y Y N Y* Y* N
Issue-wise dist. (IwD) Y N Y Y* N Y*
IUO Hamming sets (IUO HS) Y* N N Y N N
IUO Issue-wise sets (IUO IwS)
IUO Hamming dist. (IUO HD) Y* Y* N Y Y N
IUO Issue-wise dist. (IUO IwD) Y* N Y* Y N Y
Table 2: Pareto optimality relations between the different preference classes. A Y means Pareto
optimality carries over from the class in the row to the class in the column, and a Y ∗ means it only
carries over if the operator only produces compatible labelings.
3.2 Case 1: in, out, and undec are Equally Distant from Each Other
3.2.1 Hamming Set and Hamming Distance
In this part, we establish the first advantage of the skeptical operator over the credulous and super
credulous operators. When all individuals’ preferences are Hamming set based, or all are Hamming
distance based, the skeptical operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are
smaller or equal (v) to each individual’s labeling.
Theorem 5. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the skeptical aggregation op-
erator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of
the participants’ labelings.
Theorem 6. If individual preferences are Hamming distance based, then the skeptical aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each
of the participants’ labelings.
On the other hand, the credulous and super credulous operators are only Pareto optimal when
individuals have Hamming set based preferences, and they fail to produce Pareto optimal outcomes
when the preferences are Hamming distance based.
Theorem 7. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the credulous aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of
the participants’ labelings.
Theorem 8. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the super credulous aggrega-
tion operator is Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible (≈) with each
of the participants’ labelings.
Observation 1. If individual preferences are Hamming distance based, then the credulous (resp.
the super credulous) aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp.
complete) labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
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3.2.2 Issue-wise Set and Issue-wise Distance
Given Lemma 1, we can substitute “Hamming set” with “Issue-wise set” in Theorem 5, Theo-
rem 7 and Theorem 8.
Unfortunately, Lemma 1 only concerns the implication from Hamming set to Issue-wise set
based preferences and vice versa. One might wonder if a similar lemma can be shown for the case
with Hamming distance and Issue-wise distance based preferences. However, we show in Exam-
ples 1 and 2 in the Appendix, that this is not necessarily the case. As such, one has to show whether
Pareto optimality results hold or not for Issue-wise distance based preferences independently from
those of the Hamming distance based preferences.
Doing so confirms the superiority of the skeptical operator for the Issue-wise distance-based
preferences. As we show next, when agents preferences are Issue-wise distance based, only the
skeptical aggregation operator is guaranteed to produce Pareto optimal outcomes.
Theorem 9. If individual preferences are Issue-wise distance based, then the skeptical aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (w.r.t v) to
each of the participants’ labelings.
Observation 2. If individual preferences are Issue-wise distance based, then the credulous (resp.
the super credulous) aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp.
complete) labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
3.3 Case 2: undec is in the Middle between in and out
We now analyze the Pareto optimality for the three operators given the classes of preferences that
assume undec to be in the middle between in and out (dist(dec,undec) < dist(in,out)). We
show that for the three considered operators, it is possible to show an equivalence with the results
of Section 3.2.
3.3.1 IUO Hamming Sets and IUO Hamming Distance
IUO Hamming sets (resp. IUO Hamming distance) differs from the Hamming set (resp. Hamming
distance) in that the former separates in/out disagreement from dec/undec disagreement. We
use Theorem 3 to show the results for this part.
Proposition 1. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets (resp. distance) based, then the
skeptical aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller
or equal (v) to each of the participants’ labelings.
As for the credulous and super credulous operators, their results given IUO Hamming set and
distance based preferences echo their results with the Hamming set and distance based prefer-
ences. Both credulous and super credulous produce Pareto optimal outcomes given Hamming set
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based preferences, but can fail to produce Pareto optimal outcomes given Hamming distance based
preferences.
Proposition 2. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets based, then the credulous aggre-
gation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each of the participants’ labelings.
Proposition 3. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based, then the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proposition 4. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets based, then the super credulous
aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible (≈)
with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proposition 5. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based, then the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
3.3.2 IUO Issue-wise Sets and IUO Issue-wise Distance
Again, given the discussion earlier as a result of Lemma 1 (i.e. IUO Issue-wise sets based pref-
erences coincide with IUO Hamming sets based preferences), we can substitute “IUO Hamming
sets” with “IUO Issue-wise sets” in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4.
Next, we show the results for the IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Proposition 6. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the skeptical
aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal
(v) to each of the participants’ labelings.
We now turn to the credulous aggregation operator.
Proposition 7. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Finally, we turn to the super credulous aggregation operator.
Proposition 8. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Table 3 summarizes the Pareto optimality results for the three operators given all the eight
classes of preferences.
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Skeptical Credulous Super Credulous
Operator Operator Operator
Hamming set Yes (Thm. 5) Yes (Thm. 7) Yes (Thm. 8)
Issue-wise set
Hamming dist. Yes (Thm. 6) No (Obs. 1) No (Obs. 1)
Issue-wise dist. Yes (Thm. 9) No (Obs. 2) No (Obs. 2)
IUO Hamming sets Yes (Prop. 1) Yes (Prop. 2) Yes (Prop. 4)
IUO Issue-wise sets
IUO Hamming dist. Yes (Prop. 1) No (Prop. 3) No (Prop. 5)
IUO Issue-wise dist. Yes (Prop. 6) No (Prop. 7) No (Prop. 8)
Table 3: Pareto optimality in a set S of the aggregation operators depending on the type of prefer-
ence. The set S differs for each operator. For the skeptical operator, it is the set of all admissible
labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the participants’ labelings. For the credulous
(resp. super credulous) operator, it is the set of all admissible (resp. complete) labelings that are
compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
3.4 Heterogeneous Preferences
The previous subsections have all considered the case where agents have homogeneous prefer-
ences i.e. agents share the same class of preferences (e.g. all agents have Hamming set based
preferences). However, there can be some scenarios where this assumption does not hold. In this
part, we study the effect of removing this assumption.
Let F be the set of all classes of preferences, R be some arbitrary subset of F, and c : Ag→ F
be a function defining the class of preferences for each agent. We say that the set of agents Ag have
homogeneous preferences from R if ∀i, j ∈ Ag : c(i) = c( j) ∈ R. We say Ag have heterogeneous
preferences from R if ∀i ∈ Ag : c(i) ∈ R and ∃i, j ∈ Ag s.t. c(i) 6= c( j).
Let R be an arbitrary set of classes of preferences. In general, if a labeling L is Pareto optimal
in a set S given that Ag have homogeneous preferences from R, then Lmight not be Pareto optimal
if Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R (see Example 3 in the Appendix).
However, one can show that some of the classes of preferences that we defined enjoy special
relations with each others that make Pareto optimality carry over from homogeneous preference of
each of those classes to heterogeneous preferences that combine all of those classes. Consider the
following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let R= {,M} be a set of preference classes, Ag be a set of agents, S be the set of
all admissible labelings that are compatible with each individual’s labeling, and L be a labeling
from S. If L is Pareto optimal in S given that Ag have homogeneous preferences from R, then L is
Pareto optimal in S given that Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Also, given our discussion in Lemma 1, we can add Issue-wise setW and IUO Issue-wise setsMW to the set R in the previous result. For our three operators, we have the following corollaries.
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Corollary 1. Let R = {,W,M,MW}. The skeptical operator is Pareto optimal in the set of
all admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the participants’ labelings given
that individuals have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Corollary 2. Let R = {,W,M,MW}. The credulous operator is Pareto optimal in the set of
all admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings given that
individuals have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Corollary 3. Let R = {,W,M,MW}. The super credulous operator is Pareto optimal in the
set of all complete labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings given
that individuals have heterogeneous preferences from R.
We showed earlier that the skeptical operator is always Pareto optimal no matter which class
of preferences the individuals have, as long as all agents have the same class i.e. homogenous
preferences (as Table 3 shows). We show here even a stronger result, that is even when agents
preferences are hererogenous, and no matter what the combination of classes of preferences that
they have, the skeptical operator sustains Pareto optimality. This establishes the robustness of the
skeptical operator when it comes to Pareto optimality.
Theorem 11. LetR= {,W,M,MW, || , |W| , ∣∣M∣∣ , ∣∣MW∣∣}. The skeptical operator is Pareto
optimal in the set of all admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the partici-
pants’ labelings given that individuals have heterogeneous preferences from R.
4 Strategy Proofness
Strategic manipulability is usually an undesirable property in which an agent, upon knowing the
preferences of other individuals, has incentive to misrepresent her own true opinion in order to
force a collective outcome which is closer to her true opinion. A strategic lie is what an agent can
say if and when she has the opportunity to vote strategically.
Definition 29 (Strategic lie). Let P be a profile and Lk ∈ P be the most preferred labeling of
an agent with preference k. Let Op be any aggregation operator. A labeling L′k such that
Op(PLk/L′k) k Op(P) is called a strategic lie. Where PLk/L′k is the profile that results from the
profile P after agent k changes her vote from Lk to L′k.
A strategy proof operator is one where individuals have no incentive to make strategic lies.
Definition 30 (Strategy proof operator). An aggregation operator Op is strategy proof if strategic
lies are not possible.
Despite the fact that, as we shall see, for most classes of preference, the aggregation operators
turned out to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation, a novel type of lie emerged: the benevolent
lie. Unlike the malicious lie, the benevolent lie has positive effects on some of the other agents and
no negative effects on any agent.
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Definition 31 (Malicious lie). Let Op be some aggregation operator and P be a profile of labelings.
We say that a strategic lie L′k is malicious iff, for some agent j 6= k, Op(P) j Op(PLk/L′k).
Definition 32 (Benevolent lie). Let Op be some aggregation operator and P be a profile of label-
ings. We say that a strategic lie L′k is benevolent iff, for any agent i Op(PLk/L′k) i Op(P) and
there exists an agent j 6= k, Op(PLk/L′k) j Op(P).
4.1 Connections between Classes of Preferences
Similar to the previous section, we start by showing general connections. First, note that the results
of Lemma 1 holds in this case. This means that the benevolence property (that is, all strategic lies
are benevolent) carries over between Hamming set and Issue-wise set based preferences. The
same goes for IUO Hamming set and IUO Issue-wise set based preferences. Fruther, we show that
this benevolence property carries over from Hamming distance to IUO Hamming distance based
preferences, and from Issue-wise distance to IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Theorem 12. Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each individual’s labeling. If all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have Hamming distance
based preferences then all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have IUO Hamming distance
based preferences.
Theorem 13. Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each individual’s labeling. If all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have Issue-wise distance
based preferences then all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have IUO Issue-wise distance
based preferences.
Now we turn to studying the strategy proofness of the three operators: the skeptical, the cred-
ulous and the super credulous.
4.2 Case 1: in, out, and undec are Equally Distant from Each Other
4.2.1 Hamming Set and Hamming Distance
Following, we show that none of the three operators is strategy proof given Hamming set (resp.
Hamming distance) based preferences.
Observation 3. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof for neither Hamming set
nor Hamming distance based preferences.
Observation 4. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither Hamming set nor Hamming distance based preferences.
For the skeptical aggregation operator, however, every strategic lie is benevolent, given Ham-
ming set (resp. Hamming distance) based preferences. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the
credulous or the super credulous operators.
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Theorem 14. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Hamming set based preferences.
For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Theorem 15. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Hamming distance based prefer-
ences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Note that the previous two theorems raise an interesting point. Given the Pareto optimality of
the skeptical operator for Hamming set/distance based preferences, one would expect that benev-
olent lies are not possible. Otherwise, it means there exists another labeling that is more preferred
by every agent and strictly preferred by at lease one agent. This contradicts the Pareto optimality
result found earlier.
However, it is important to remember that the Pareto optimality results found earlier are all
with respect to the sets of labelings that are smaller or equal (or compatible in the case of the other
operators) to each individuals’ labelings. On the other hand, an outcome given a benevolent lie
is not compatible with every individual’s labeling i.e. while the skeptical operator does produce
labelings that are compatible with each individual’s true labeling, it does so for the submitted
labelings only. Hence, when an agent k lies and submits L′k instead of Lk, the outcome L
′
SO (which
is the outcome when k submits L′k) is compatible with L
′
k but not necessarily to Lk. As a result, the
labeling L′SO does not belong to the set of labelings that LSO is compared to when studying Pareto
optimality.
This highlights another interesting point that can be implied by the benevolence and Pareto
optimality of the skeptical operator. When using the skeptical operator, whenever an agent k con-
siders lying in order to get a closer labeling to Lk, she is faced with an inevitable trade-off between
getting a less or equally committed outcome and getting a closer (i.e. more preferred) outcome.
4.2.2 Issue-wise Set and Issue-wise Distance
Similar to the Hamming based preferences, none of the three operators is strategy proof given
Issue-wise set (resp. Issue-wise distance) based preferences.
Observation 5. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof for neither Issue-wise set
nor Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Observation 6. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither Issue-wise set nor Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Again, similar to the Hamming based preference, only the skeptical aggregation operator has
the benevolent property (every strategic lie is benevolent), given Issue-wise set (resp. Issue-wise
distance) based preferences. As for the Issue-wise set based preferences, we can use the result of
Lemma 1 (that is, Issue-wise set based preferences coincide with Hamming set based preferences)
to substitute “Hamming set” with “Issue-wise set” in Theorem 14. As for the Issue-wise distance
based preferences, it is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 16. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Issue-wise distance based prefer-
ences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
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4.3 Case 2: undec is in the Middle between in and out
In this part, we analyze the strategy proofness for the three operators given the classes of prefer-
ences that assume undec is in the middle between in and out (dist(dec,undec) < dist(in,out)).
4.3.1 IUO Hamming Sets and IUO Hamming Distance
Following, we show the strongest result for this section. The skeptical operator is strategy proof
given the IUO Hamming sets based preferences. This result also holds for IUO Issue-wise sets
given the discussion for Lemma 1.
Theorem 17. The skeptical aggregation operator is strategy proof when individuals have IUO
Hamming sets based preferences.
The previous result does not hold for the credulous or the super credulous operators. Further,
none of the three operators is strategy-proof when individuals have IUO Hamming distance based
preferences. However, as was the case with other classes of preferences, lies with the skeptical
operators are always benevolent, unlike those with the credulous or the super credulou operators.
Observation 7. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof when individuals have
IUO Hamming distance based preferences.
Observation 8. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither IUO Hamming sets nor IUO Hamming distance based preferences.
Proposition 9. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and IUO Hamming distance based
preferences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
4.3.2 IUO Issue-wise Sets and IUO Issue-wise Distance
Similar to the results in the previous part, the skeptical operator is strategy-proof given IUO
Issue-wise sets based preferences (by substituting “IUO Hamming sets” with “IUO Issue-wise
sets” in Theorem 17, given the discussion for Lemma 1), unlike the credulous or the super credu-
lous operators for which lies are possible and might not be benevolent. Further, none of the three
operators is strategy-proof when individuals have IUO Hamming distance based preferences, but
lies with the skeptical operators are always benevolent, unlike those with the credulous or the super
credulou operators.
Observation 9. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof when individuals have
IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Observation 10. The credulous and super credulous aggregation operators are not strategy proof
when individuals have IUO Issue-wise sets (resp. distance) based preferences.
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Proposition 10. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and IUO Issue-wise distance based
preferences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Table 4 summarizes the strategy proofness results for the three operators given all the eight
classes of preferences.
Skeptical Credulous Super Credulous
Operator Operator Operator
Hamming set No (Obs. 3 and 5) No, and No, and
Issue-wise set but benev. (Thm. 14) not benev. (Obs. 4 and 6) not benev. (Obs. 4 and 6)
Hamming dist. No (Obs. 3) No, and No, and
but benev. (Thm. 15) not benev. (Obs. 4) not benev. (Obs. 4)
Issue-wise dist. No (Obs. 5) No, and No, and
but benev. (Thm. 16) not benev. (Obs. 6) not benev. (Obs. 6)
IUO Hamming sets Yes (Thm. 17) No, and No, and
IUO Issue-wise sets not benev. (Obs. 8 and 10) not benev. (Obs. 8 and 10)
IUO Hamming dist. No (Obs. 7) No, and No, and
but benev. (Prop. 9) not benev. (Obs. 8) not benev. (Obs. 8)
IUO Issue-wise dist. No (Obs. 9) No, and No, and
but benev. (Prop. 10) not benev. (Obs. 10) not benev. (Obs. 10)
Table 4: Strategy proofness of operators depending on the type of preferences.
4.4 Heterogeneous Preferences
Following Subsection 3.4, we do a similar analysis for the case where agents have heterogeneous
preferences. Since strategy proofness is usually considered given other agents’s preferences are
fixed, it is easy to show the result for the heterogeneous preferences given the homogeneous pref-
erences.
Theorem 18. Let F be the set of all possible classes of preferences, R be some set s.t. R ⊆ F,
and Ag be the set of agents. If an operator is strategy proof given that Ag have homogeneous
preferences from R, then it is strategy proof given that Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Corollary 4. Let R= {M,MW}. The skeptical aggregation operator is strategy proof given that
agents have heterogeneous preferences from R.
5 Discussion and Future Work
In order to apply argumentation to multi-agent conflict resolution, it is crucial to take into account
not only postulates about logical consistency, but also measures of social optimality and strategic
manipulation. Two key criteria are Pareto optimality and strategy proofness, which are fundamen-
tal in any social choice and multi-agent setting. In this study, we have analyzed and compared three
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aggregation operators, namely the skeptical, the credulous and the super credulous operators with
respect to a wide range of classes of preferences. Our comparison is based on two fundamental
criteria, namely Pareto optimality and strategy proofness. Eight different classes of preferences
were considered by using eight different distance methods. Additionally, we established relations
between the different classes of preferences. Some of these relations hold for any aggregation op-
erator and others for some special aggregation operators. Moreover, we also consider cases where
agents do not share the same classes of preference.
We showed that the skeptical operator guarantees Pareto optimal outcomes given all the dif-
ferent classes of preferences, while the credulous and super credulous operators only guarantee
Pareto optimal outcomes given the set-based preferences. Since more committed outcomes might
be more desirable in general, credulous and super credulous operators will be preferable if individ-
uals’ preferences are known to be set-based. However, if the individuals preferences are unknown
or are known to be distance-based, then there is a trade-off between Pareto optimality and the more
committed outcomes. As for the strategy proofness, the three operators are vulnerable to manip-
ulation given most classes of preferences. However, the skeptical operator guarantees benevolent
lies. Understandably, unlike malicious lies, benevolent ones are not harmful to the group. Hence,
there is another trade-off in choosing an appropriate operator between avoiding the malicious lies
and choosing the more committed outcomes.
Few studies have considered Pareto optimality and strategy proofness with argument based
aggregation. Rahwan and Larson [39] defined a set of simplistic agents preferences over argumen-
tation outcomes, and studied the Pareto optimality of different argument evaluation rules defined
using classical semantics (e.g. complete,...etc.) given agents with these simple types of prefer-
ences. Unlike Rahwan and Larson, we study the Pareto optimality of labeling aggregation oper-
ators that produce a collective evaluation given many different evaluations. Another difference is
that we consider more realistic, distance-based preferences. As for strategy proofness, since the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [27, 44], much research has been done towards analyzing strategic
manipulation of preference aggregation (PA) rules [28, 29, 35, 19, 36, 25]. Strategy proofness of
judgment aggregation (JA) operators have been first studied by Dietrich and List [20, 21]. In the
former, Dietrich mentioned some independence conditions that make the rule strategy proof. In the
latter, Dietrich and List showed equivalence between satisfying strategy proofness and satisfying
both the independence and monotonicity postulates.
The first study of strategy proofness of labeling aggregation operator has been done by Rahwan
and Tohme´ [42] in the context of a specific labeling aggregation operator (argument-wise plurality
rule). They showed the strategy proofness of this operator given agents with a particular class
of preferences, dubbed focal set preferences. Our work considers different labeling aggregation
operators, and we provide the first broad analysis for strategy proofness of labeling aggregation
operators given a wide variety of preferences. Strategic manipulation in argumentation has also
been studied by Rahwan, Larson and others [40, 38, 37], when arguments are distributed among
agents, and where these agents may choose to show or hide arguments. Thus, that work focuses
on how agents contribute to the construction of the argument graph itself, which is then evaluated
centrally by the mechanism (e.g. a judge). In contrast, our present paper is concerned with strategic
manipulation of labeling aggregation operators which take as input different evaluations of a given
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fixed graph. In fact, the difference between our problem and theirs can be analogized to jury
versus litigators. The former are provided with shared information, while the latter propose their
information on a dialog basis.
We believe that one of the strengths of the argumentation approach is that it is able to provide
a dialectical specification of non-monotonic inference. That is, whether or not an argument is
accepted (w.r.t. a specific argumentation semantics) can be assessed using dialectical proof proce-
dures. For instance whether an argument is labelled in by the grounded labelling can be assessed
using either the Standard Grounded Game [34] or the more recently defined Grounded Persuasion
Game [17]. Another example is the Admissibility Game [13] that assesses whether an argument A
is in an admissible set (equiv. in a preferred extension or a complete extension). The seminal work
by Dung with model-based semantics such as the grounded and preferred semantics laid the build-
ing blocks for these games. Likewise, we believe our work and the work of Caminada and Pigozzi
[15] lays the building blocks for dialectical preference aggregation by studying the aggregation
of opinions using model-based semantics. For instance, by using modified versions of the above
mentioned games, one can define a game for the down-admissible operator and a game for the
up-complete operator. Then, using these two games, one can provide dialectical proof procedures
for each of the JA-operators (skeptical, credulous and super-credulous) studied in this work. The
interested reader can refer to the technical report [12] for more details about how the previously
mentioned games can be modified to define games for the studied aggregation operators.
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Appendix
This part contains proofs and counterexamples for the results presented in the paper “Pareto Opti-
mality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation”
1 General Lemmas
The following two lemmas are crucial for establishing the relations between the different classes
of preferences. The first lemma implies a very interesting result. While Hamming distance and
Issue-wise distance based preferences are different, as we showed earlier, Hamming set and Issue-
wise set based preferences are equivalent. The same can also be said about IUO Hamming sets and
IUO Issue-wise sets. Hence, all the results in this paper that hold (resp. do not hold) for Hamming
set based preferences would also hold (resp. do not hold) for Issue-wise set based preferences. The
same can be also said about IUO Hamming sets and IUO issue-wise set.
Lemma 1. Issue-wise set based preferences coincide with Hamming set based preferences, and
IUO Issue-wise sets based preferences coincide with IUO Hamming sets based preferences. For-
mally, letAF= 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework, and letL1,L2, andL3 be three labelings.
Then:
1. L1L2 ⊆ L1L3⇔ L1WL2 ⊆ L1WL3.
(or equivalently L2 1,	 L3⇔ L2 1,	W L3)
2. L1ML2 ⊆ L1ML3⇔ L1MWL2 ⊆ L1MWL3.
(or equivalently L2 1,	M L3⇔ L2 1,	M
W
L3
Proof. Let I be the set of all issues in AF.
1. (⇒): From the definition of issues, we have that ∀B ∈ L1WL2 (where B ∈ I):
∀A ∈A : A ∈B⇒ A ∈ L1L2
Then, by assumption, we have A ∈ L1L3. Hence, we have ∀A ∈ B : A ∈ L1L3. Then,
B ∈ L1WL3.
(⇐): Consider an arbitrary argument A s.t. A ∈ L1L2. Let B ∈ I be s.t. A ∈B. Then:
∀A′ 6= A : A′ ∈B⇒ A′ ∈ L1L2
from the definition of issues. This means thatB∈L1WL2. By assumption,B∈L1WL3.
Then, A ∈ L1L3.
2. Similar to (1), but instead of showing from  to W and vice versa, it is enough to show
from io and du to ioW and duW and vice versa, respectively.
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Using the definitions of set-based preferences yieldL21,	 L3⇔L21,	W L3 andL21,	M
L3⇔ L2 1,	M
W
L3.

The following lemma is important in the context of compatible operators. For each agent i∈Ag,
let Li = L1. Then, provided the conditions below, the lemma says an individual’s preference over
L2 and L3 would coincide whether she has a Hamming set (resp. distance) or IUO Hamming sets
(resp. distance). The same can be said about Issue-wise set (resp. distance) and IUO Issue-wise
sets (resp. distance).
Lemma 2. Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. Let L1, L2, and L3 be three
labelings and let L1 ≈ L2 and L1 ≈ L3:
1. L1L2 ⊆ L1L3⇔ L1ML2 ⊆ L1ML3, and
L1 ||L2 ≤ L1 ||L3⇔ L1 ∣∣M∣∣L2 ≤ L1 ∣∣M∣∣L3.
(or equivalently L2 1,	 L3⇔ L2 1,	M L3 and L2 1,|	| L3⇔ L2 1,|	M| L3)
2. L1WL2 ⊆ L1WL3⇔ L1MWL2 ⊆ L1MWL3, and
L1 |W|L2 ≤ L1 |W|L3⇔ L1 ∣∣MW∣∣L2 ≤ L1 ∣∣MW∣∣L3.
(or equivalently L2 1,	W L3⇔ L2 1,	M
W
L3 and L2 1,|	W| L3⇔ L2 1,|	MW| L3)
Proof. 1. Since L1 ≈ L2 then:
¬∃A ∈A s.t. (L1(A) = in∧L2(A) = out)∨ (L1(A) = out∧L2(A) = in) (17)
Therefore L1ioL2 = /0 which implies:
L1ML2 = L1duL2 = L1L2 (18)
and
L1
∣∣∣M∣∣∣L2 = ∣∣∣L1duL2∣∣∣= L1 ||L2 (19)
Similarly, we can show that:
L1ML3 = L1duL3 = L1L3 (20)
and
L1
∣∣∣M∣∣∣L3 = ∣∣∣L1duL3∣∣∣= L1 ||L3 (21)
Now, using Eq.18 and Eq.20 together, and using Eq.19 and Eq.21 together, we can prove
both directions for the results in 1. Then, the equilvance follows from the definitions of
set-based and distance-based preferences.
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2. Let I be the set of all issues in AF. Since L1 ≈ L2 then:
¬∃B ∈ I s.t. (L1(A) = in∧L2(A) = out)∨ (L1(A) = out∧L2(A) = in)
for some (equiv. all) A ∈B (22)
The rest is similar.

The following lemmas are also crucial for the proofs of theorems in this paper. Since the
labelings have only three values, we can use the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. Let dec(L) = in(L)∪ out(L)
∀L ∈ Labs. For any pair L1,L2 ∈ Labs:
a) L1L2 = (in(L1)∩out(L2))∪(in(L1)∩undec(L2))∪(out(L1)∩in(L2))∪(out(L1)∩
undec(L2))∪ (undec(L1)∩in(L2))∪ (undec(L1)∩out(L2))
b) if L1 v L2 then L1L2 = undec(L1)∩dec(L2)
c) if L1 ≈ L2 then L1L2 = (dec(L1)∩undec(L2))∪ (undec(L1)∩dec(L2))
Proof.
a) This follows from the fact that in(L), out(L) and undec(L) partition the domain of any
labeling L.
b) From L1 v L2, the sets (in(L1)∩ out(L2)), (in(L1)∩ undec(L2)), (out(L1)∩ in(L2)),
and (out(L1)∩undec(L2)) are all empty sets. Then, we are left with the following:
(undec(L1)∩in(L2))∪ (undec(L1)∩out(L2))
which can be written as:
undec(L1)∩ (in(L2)∪out(L2))
and replacing in(L)∪out(L) by dec(L) would give the result.
c) From L1 ≈ L2, the sets (in(L1)∩ out(L2)), and (out(L1)∩ in(L2)) are empty. The rest
can be rearranged similarly to b), and replacing in(L)∪out(L) by dec(L) would give the
result.

We now prove two lemmas establishing the relations between less or equally committed label-
ings and Hamming based preferences over labelings.
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Lemma 4. LetAF= 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. Let L, L′ and Li be three labelings
such thatLvL′vLi. IfLi is the most preferred labeling of agent i and her preference is Hamming
set or Hamming distance based, then L′ i, L and L′ i,|| L respectively.
Proof. FromLvL′, we have that dec(L)⊆ dec(L′), which is equivalent to undec(L′)⊆ undec(L)
because undec is the complement of dec. From this, it follows that undec(L′)∩ dec(Li) ⊆
undec(L)∩dec(Li). Since LvLi and L′ vLi (by assumption and transitivity of v), we can use
Lemma 3b to obtain L′Li ⊆ LLi. By definition we have that L′ i, L and L′ i,|| L. 
Lemma 5. LetAF= 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. Let L, L′ and Li be three labelings
and let LvLi. If Li is the most preferred labeling of agent i, her preference is Hamming set based
and L′ i, L, then Lv L′.
Proof. L′ i, L implies L′Li ⊆LLi which implies L(A) =Li(A)⇒L′(A) =Li(A) for any
argument A (i). Now, L v Li implies L(A) = Li(A) for any A ∈ dec(L) (ii). From (i) and (ii) it
follows that L(A) = L′(A) for any A ∈ dec(L). Hence Lv L′. 
2 Pareto Optimality
Theorem 2. Let ⊗ ∈ {	,	M,	W,	MW} be a set measure and |⊗ | be its corresponding distance
measure (i.e. if ⊗=	M then |⊗ |= |	M |). If a labeling is Pareto optimal in a set S given agents
with |⊗ |-based preferences, then it is Pareto optimal in S given agents with ⊗-based preferences.
Proof. Let S be a set of labelings, and L be a labeling that is Pareto optimal in S given agents with
|⊗ |-based preferences. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that L is not Pareto optimal in S given
agents with ⊗-based preferences. Then, ∃LX ∈ S such that:
(∀i ∈ Ag: LX i,⊗ L)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX  j,⊗ L) (23)
From the definition of strict preferences :
(∀i ∈ Ag: LX i,⊗ L)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX  j,⊗ L∧¬L j,⊗ LX) (24)
From the definition of set-based preference:
(∀i ∈ Ag: LX ⊗Li ⊆ L⊗Li)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX ⊗L j ⊂ L⊗L j) (25)
This implies:
(∀i ∈ Ag: LX |⊗|Li ≤ L |⊗|Li)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX |⊗|L j < L |⊗|L j) (26)
Which means that L is not Pareto optimal in S given agents with |⊗ |-based preferences. Contra-
diction. 
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Theorem 3. Let X be the set of all admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the
participants’ individual labelings. Let S be any arbitrary set such that S ⊆ X. A labeling from S
is Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are Hamming set (resp. distance) based iff it is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets (resp. distance) based.
Proof. (⇒): Let L and L′ be two labelings in S. Suppose L is Pareto optimal in S when agents
have Hamming set based preferences. Then, there is no labeling LX that Pareto dominates L w.r.t
Hamming set based preferences:
¬∃LX ∈ S s.t. (∀i ∈ Ag : LX Li ⊆ LLi)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LL j 6⊆ LX L j) (27)
Note that since L,LX ∈ S ⊆ X, then L ≈ Li, and LX ≈ Li, ∀i ∈ Ag, then by using Lemma 2
(1) for each label Li, this is equivalent to:
¬∃LX ∈ S s.t. (∀i ∈ Ag : LX MLi ⊆ LMLi)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LML j 6⊆ LX ML j) (28)
Similarly, suppose L′ is Pareto optimal in S when agents have Hamming distance based pref-
erences. Then, there is no labeling LX that Pareto dominates L w.r.t Hamming distance based
preferences:
¬∃LX ∈ S s.t. (∀i ∈ Ag : LX ||Li ≤ L′ ||Li)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. L′ ||L j 6≤ LX ||L j) (29)
Also by using Lemma 2 (1) for each label Li, this is equivalent to:
¬∃LX ∈ S s.t. (∀i ∈ Ag : LX
∣∣∣M∣∣∣Li ≤ L′ ∣∣∣M∣∣∣Li)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. L′ ∣∣∣M∣∣∣L j 6≤ LX ∣∣∣M∣∣∣L j)
(30)
(⇐): Similar to (⇒) 
Theorem 4. Let X be the set of all admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the
participants’ individual labelings. Let S be any arbitrary set such that S⊆X. A labeling from S is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are Issue-wise set (resp. distance) based iff it is
Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise sets (resp. distance) based.
Proof. (⇒): Let I be the set of all issues in AF, and let L and L′ be two labelings in S. Suppose
L is Pareto optimal in S when agents have Issue-wise set based preferences. Then, there is no
labeling LX that Pareto dominates L w.r.t Issue-wise set based preferences:
¬∃LX ∈ S s.t. (∀i ∈ Ag : LX WLi ⊆ LWLi)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LWL j 6⊆ LX WL j) (31)
The rest is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 (using “issues” instead of “arguments” with the
help of Lemma 2 (2)).

The following two examples are used to show the results discussed in the subsection 3.1.3
Failed Connections.
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Example 1. Consider Figure 7, let Ag = {1,2} be the set of agents 1 and 2, whose preferred
labelings are respectively L1 and L2, and let S= {LCO,LX}. Note the following:
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with Hamming (Issue-wise) set based preferences.
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with Issue-wise distance based preferences.
• LCO is not Pareto optimal in S given agents with Hamming distance based preferences.
Since both LCO and LX are admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with both of L1 and L2,
then using Theorems 3 and 4:
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Hamming (Issue-wise) set based prefer-
ences.
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences.
• LCO is not Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Hamming distance based preferences.
Figure 7: An example showing how Pareto optimality given agents with (IUO) Hamming distance
based preferences cannot be inferred from other classes of preferences. The set of arguments
located in one box form an issue.
Also consider the following example.
Example 2. Consider Figure 8, let Ag = {1,2} be the set of agents 1 and 2, whose preferred
labelings are respectively L1 and L2, and let S= {LCO,LX}. Note the following:
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with Hamming (Issue-wise) set based preferences.
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with Hamming distance based preferences.
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• LCO is not Pareto optimal in S given agents with Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Also, since both LCO and LX are admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with both of L1 and
L2, then using Theorems 3 and 4:
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Hamming (Issue-wise) set based prefer-
ences.
• LCO is Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Hamming distance based preferences.
• LCO is not Pareto optimal in S given agents with IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Figure 8: An example showing how Pareto optimality given agents with (IUO) Issue-wise distance
based preferences cannot be inferred from other classes of preferences. The set of arguments
located in one box form an issue.
Following, we show the results about Pareto optimality regarding the three operators: the skep-
tical, the credulous and the super credulous.
Theorem 5. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the skeptical aggregation op-
erator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of
the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let P be a profile of labelings, LSO = soAF(P) and LX some admissible labeling with the
property ∀i ∈ Ag,LX v Li. From Theorem 1 we know that LSO is the biggest admissible labeling
with such property, so LX v LSO. So we have ∀i ∈ Ag,LX v LSO v Li. From Lemma 4 we have
LSO i LX for any i. So no agent strictly prefers LX and hence there is no labeling that Pareto
dominates LSO. 
Theorem 6. If individual preferences are Hamming distance based, then the skeptical aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each
of the participants’ labelings.
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Proof. In the proof of Theorem 5, Hamming set may be replaced by Hamming distance because it
is only used in Lemma 4, which works for Hamming distance as well. 
Theorem 7. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the credulous aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of
the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let P be a profile of labelings, LCO = coAF(P), LCIO = cioAF(P). Assume by contradic-
tion that there exists some admissible labeling LX with the property ∀i ∈ Ag,LX ≈ Li that Pareto
dominates LCO.
First notice that compatibility ensures that there are no in/out conflicts between LX and LCO.
If there is an in/out conflict between agents’ labelings on some argument, then both LX and LCO
need to label it undec. If there exists an agent whose labeling decides on some argument and other
agents’ labelings agree or refrain from decision, LCO and LX also agree or refrain from decision.
If all agents refrain from decision on some argument, LCO by definition also refrains, and LX may
label freely.
Let us take A ∈ dec(LX). Then, there needs to be an agent with a labeling that agrees on A.
Otherwise all agents’ labelings would be undecided on such argument and, according to definition,
LCO would not decide either. But then all agents’ labelings will agree on such argument with LCO
and disagree with LX , so no agent will strongly prefer LX , which contradicts with domination.
So there exists at least one agent whose labeling agrees with LX on A. Other agents’ labelings
also need to agree on A or label it undec because of the compatibility of LX . Then by definition
LCIO(A) = LX(A). This holds for any argument A ∈ dec(LX), so we have LX v LCIO. But LX is
admissible and, by definition, LCO is the biggest admissible labeling less or equally committed as
LCIO. So we have LX v LCO v LCIO.
LX must be different from LCO to dominate it. Let A be an argument on which these labelings
differ. From the previous considerations, it follows that A ∈ undec(LX) and A ∈ dec(LCO). LCO
decides on an argument only if there exists an agent that decides on such argument. But then
this agent will agree on A with LCO and disagree with LX , so it will not prefer LX . This is in
contradiction with dominance. Hence, such dominating labeling cannot exist. 
Observation 11. If individual preferences are Hamming distance based, then the credulous (resp.
the super credulous) aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp.
complete) labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings. An example
is given in Figure 9 where LCO represents the outcome of the credulous (or the super credulous)
aggregation operator. Both labelings LCO and LX are compatible with both L1 and L2, but LX is
closer when applying Hamming distance. L1LCO = L2LCO = {A,B,E,F,G}, so the Ham-
ming distance is 5, whereas L1LX = L2LX = {A,B,C,D}, so the Hamming distance is 4.
Theorem 8. If individual preferences are Hamming set based, then the super credulous aggrega-
tion operator is Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible (≈) with each
of the participants’ labelings.
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Figure 9: If individuals’ preferences are Hamming distance based, the (super) credulous aggre-
gation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp. complete) labelings that are
compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let P be a profile of labelings, LCIO = cioAF(P), LCO = coAF(P), and LSCO = scoAF(P).
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a complete labeling LX s.t. LX ≈ Li ∀i ∈ Ag,
and LX dominates LSCO (w.r.t i,).
Let A ∈ dec(LCO), then LSCO agrees on A with LCO. However, LCO only decides on an
argument if at least one agent decides on this argument and agrees with LCO on it. Then, this
agent also agrees on A with LSCO. Since LX , by assumption, Pareto dominates LSCO, LX also
needs to agree with this agent on A. This is the case for every argument A ∈ dec(LCO). Hence,
∀A ∈ dec(LCO) :LCO(A) =LX(A). Then, LCO vLX . By definition, LSCO is the smallest element
(w.r.t v) of the set of all complete labelings that are bigger or equally committed than LCO. Then,
LCO v LSCO v LX .
LX should be different from LSCO to dominate it. Then, ∃A ∈ undec(LSCO)∩ dec(LX). We
will show that ∀A ∈ undec(LSCO)∩ dec(LX) then ∀i ∈ Ag : Li(A) = undec. This is enough to
reach a contradiction because it shows that all agents agree on at least one argument with LSCO
while disagree with LX on that argument.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an agent j such that L j(A) = LX(A) ∈ {in,out}.
Since A ∈ undec(LSCO), then A ∈ undec(LCO). However, LX is a complete labeling which means
that it is also an admissible labeling, and from Theorem 7, LCO is Pareto optimal in the set of all
admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings. Then:
∀B ∈A,¬∃i ∈ Ag s.t. LCO(B) 6= Li(B)∧LX(B) = Li(B) (32)
Contradiction. Then, all agents need to agree withLCO andLSCO on every A s.t. A∈ undec(LSCO)∩
dec(LX) (and disagree with LX on A). 
Theorem 9. If individual preferences are Issue-wise distance based, then the skeptical aggregation
operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (w.r.t v) to
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each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let I be the set of all issues inAF, P be a profile of labelings, andLSO = soAF(P). Suppose,
towards a contradiction, that there exists an admissible labeling LX s.t. LX v Li ∀i ∈ Ag, and LX
dominates LSO (w.r.t i,|W|). Then, there needs to be at least one issue on which LX agrees with
some labeling L j (by an agent j), while LSO disagrees with L j on that issue:
∃ j ∈ Ag,∃B ∈ I s.t. (LX(A) = L j(A))∧ (LSO(A) 6= L j(A))
for some (equiv. all) A ∈B (33)
However, from Theorem 1, LSO is the biggest labeling (w.r.t v) in X. Then LX v LSO v Li
∀i ∈ Ag. LX should be different from LSO to dominate it. Then, ∃A ∈ undec(LX)∩ dec(LSO)
(where A belongs to some issue B ∈ I). However, LSO only decides on an argument if all agents
decide on this argument and agree on it with LSO. Accordingly, all agents disagree with LX on
A. Note that this holds for all A ∈ undec(LX)∩ dec(LSO). Additionally, ∀B /∈ undec(LX)∩
dec(LSO) : LSO(B) = LX(B). Hence:
¬∃LX ∈ X s.t. ∃ j ∈ Ag : (LX(A) = L j(A))∧ (LSO(A) 6= L j(A)) for any A ∈A (34)
Contradiction. 
Observation 12. If individual preferences are Issue-wise distance based, then the credulous (resp.
the super credulous) aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp.
complete) labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings. In Figure 10,
LCO represents the outcome of the credulous (or the super credulous) aggregation operator. Note
that, both labelings of LCO and LX are compatible with both L1 and L2, but LX is closer when
applying Issue-wise distance. L1W LCO = L2W LCO = {{C,D},{E},{F}}, so Issue-wise
distance is 3, whereas L1WLX = L2WLX = {{A,B},{C,D}}, so Issue-wise distance is 2.
Proposition 1. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets (resp. distance) based, then the
skeptical aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller
or equal (v) to each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let S be the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the partic-
ipants’ labelings. Then, S ⊆ X, where X is defined in Theorem 3. From Theorem 5 and Theorem
3 the skeptical aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO
Hamming sets based. From Theorem 6 and Theorem 3 the skeptical aggregation operator is Pareto
optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based. 
Proposition 2. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets based, then the credulous aggre-
gation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let S be the set of admissible labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the partic-
ipants’ labelings. Then, S ⊆ X, where X is defined in Theorem 3 (actually S = X here). From
Theorem 7 and Theorem 3 the credulous aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in S when individ-
ual preferences are IUO Hamming sets based. 
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Figure 10: If individuals’ preferences are Issue-wise distance based, the (super) credulous aggre-
gation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible (resp. complete) labelings that are
compatible (≈) with each of the participants’ labelings. The set of arguments located in one box
form an issue.
Proposition 3. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based, then the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Similar to the previous proposition, from Observation 11 and Theorem 3 the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in S (S is defined in the previous proposition) when
individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based. 
Proposition 4. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming sets based, then the super credulous
aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible (≈)
with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let S be the set of complete labelings that are compatible (≈) with each of the participants’
labelings. Then, S ⊆ X, where X is defined in Theorem 3. From Theorem 8 and Theorem 3 the
super credulous aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO
Hamming sets based. 
Proposition 5. If individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based, then the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Similar to the previous proposition, from Observation 11 and Theorem 3 the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in S (S is defined in the previous proposition) when
individual preferences are IUO Hamming distance based. 
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Proposition 6. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the skeptical
aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal
(v) to each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Let S be the set of admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the partic-
ipants’ labelings. Then, S ⊆ X, where X is defined in Theorem 4. From Theorem 9 and Theorem
4 the skeptical aggregation operator is Pareto optimal in S when individual preferences are IUO
Issue-wise distance based. 
Proposition 7. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of admissible labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Similar to the previous proposition, from Observation 12 and Theorem 4 the credulous
aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in S (S is defined in the previous proposition) when
individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based. 
Proposition 8. If individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based, then the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in the set of complete labelings that are compatible
(≈) with each of the participants’ labelings.
Proof. Similar to the previous proposition, from Observation 12 and Theorem 4 the super credu-
lous aggregation operator is not Pareto optimal in S (S is defined in the previous proposition) when
individual preferences are IUO Issue-wise distance based. 
The following example shows how Pareto optimality does not generally carry over from ho-
mogeneous preferences to heterogeneous preferences.
Example 3. Consider the framework and labelings in Figure 11. Let Ag = {1,2}, S = {L,LX}
and R = {|| , |W|}. When Ag have homogeneous preferences from R (i.e. both agents have
Hamming distance based preferences or both have Issue-wise distance based preferences), then L
is Pareto optimal in S:
L1 ||L= 4 , L1 ||LX = 3 (i.e. LX 1,|| L)
L2 ||L= 3 , L2 ||LX = 4 (i.e. L2,|| LX )
L1 |W|L= 1 , L1 |W|LX = 2 (i.e. L1,|W| LX )
L2 |W|L= 2 , L2 |W|LX = 1 (i.e. LX 2,|W| L)
However, if agent 1 has Hamming distance based preferences and agent 2 has Issue-wise dis-
tance based preferences then both agents would strictly prefer LX over L and this means that L
would not be Pareto optimal in S when Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Theorem 10. Let R= {,M} be a set of preference classes, Ag be a set of agents, S be the set of
all admissible labelings that are compatible with each individual’s labeling, and L be a labeling
from S. If L is Pareto optimal in S given that Ag have homogeneous preferences from R, then L is
Pareto optimal in S given that Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R.
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XFigure 11: An example showing how a labeling that is Pareto optimal in a set S given that Ag have
homogeneous preferences from a set R, might not be Pareto optimal if Ag have heterogeneous
preferences from R. The set of arguments located in one box form an issue.
Proof. Let Ag be s.t. agents have heterogeneous preferences from R. Suppose towards a contra-
diction, that L is not Pareto optimal in S when each agent i has c(i) ∈ R based preferences. Then,
there is a labeling LX that Pareto dominates L w.r.t c(i) based preferences, i.e. ∃LX ∈ S s.t:
(∀i ∈ Ag : LX i,c(i) L)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX  j,c( j) L) (35)
where c(i) ∈ R,∀i ∈ Ag (i.e. c(i) =  or c(i) = M). Then, from the definition of set based
preference:
(∀i ∈ Ag : LX c(i) Li ⊆ L c(i) Li)∧ (∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. L c( j) L j 6⊆ LX c( j) L j) (36)
However, given the compatibility of L and LX with every individuals’ labeling (since L,LX ∈
S) and from Lemma 2 (1), if agents who have Hamming set based preferences switched their
classes of preferences to IUO Hamming sets based preferences or vice versa, then their preferences
would not change. As a result, the previous equation would hold even when c(k) = c(l),∀k, l ∈
Ag. This means L is not Pareto optimal in S when Ag have homogeneous preferences from R.
Contradiction. 
Theorem 11. LetR= {,W,M,MW, || , |W| , ∣∣M∣∣ , ∣∣MW∣∣}. The skeptical operator is Pareto
optimal in the set of all admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to each of the partici-
pants’ labelings given that individuals have heterogeneous preferences from R.
Proof. Let S be the set of all admissible labelings that are smaller or equal (v) to individuals’
labelings. Suppose, towards a contradiction that the skeptical operator is not Pareto optimal in S
given that the set of individuals Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R. Then, ∃LX ∈ S s.t.
LX Pareto dominates L (given heterogeneous preferences). Then:
∃ j ∈ Ag s.t. LX  j,c( j) L (37)
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However, from Theorem 1, L is the biggest admissible labeling that is smaller or equal (v) to
each individual’s labeling. Then, ∀L′ ∈ S :L′ vLvLi,∀i ∈ Ag. Hence, for any agent i’s labeling
Li, and for any argument (and consequently, any issue) on which L disagrees with Li, then LX
would disagree in exactly the same way. Contradiction. 
3 Strategy Proofness
Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with each individ-
ual’s labeling. The following lemma shows that every strategic lie with the operator Op given
IUO Hamming distance based preferences is also a strategic lie given Hamming distance based
preferences. This lemma is crucial to show that the benevolence property of lies with the skeptical
operator carries over from Hamming distance based preferences to IUO Hamming distance based
preferences.
Lemma 6. Let Op be a compatible operator. Let Lk denote the top preference labeling of agent k.
Let P be a profile where each agent submits her most preferred labeling, and let P′ = PLk/L′k be a
profile that results from P by changing Lk to L′k. Let LOp = OpAF(P) be the outcome when agent
k does not lie. Let Xk|M| (resp. Xk||) be the set of all labelings L′Op that satisfy the following two
properties:
1. There exists some labeling L′k s.t. L
′
Op = OpAF(PLk/L′k) (i.e. L
′
Op is a possible outcome
given some lie by agent k), and
2. L′Op k,|M| LOp (resp. L′Op k,|| LOp).
Then Xk|M| ⊆ Xk||.
Proof. ∀L′Op ∈ Xk|M|, we have:
1. There exists some labeling L′k s.t. L
′
Op = soAF(PLk/L′k), and
2. L′Op k,|M| LOp.
We just need to show that L′Op k,|| LOp.
Since L′Op k,|M| LOp, then L′Op ∣∣M∣∣Lk < LOp ∣∣M∣∣Lk. Then:
2×|L′OpioLk|+ |L′OpduLk|< 2×|LOpioLk|+ |LOpduLk| (38)
Since |LOpioLk|= 0:
2×|L′OpioLk|+ |L′OpduLk|< |LOpduLk| (39)
Which implies:
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|L′OpioLk|+ |L′OpduLk|< |LOpduLk| (40)
But |L′OpLk|= |L′OpioLk|+ |L′OpduLk| and |LOpLk|= |LOpduLk|. Then:
|L′OpLk|< |LOpLk| (41)
Which means L′Op || LOp. Hence, L′Op ∈ Xk||. 
We now show that the benevolence property of lies with an operator carries over from Hamming
distance based preferences to IUO Hamming distance based preferences.
Theorem 12. Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each individual’s labeling. If all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have Hamming distance
based preferences then all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have IUO Hamming distance
based preferences.
Proof. Let Op be a compatible operator. Let P be a profile, and L′k a strategic lie of agent k.
Denote LOp = OpAF(P) and L′Op = OpAF(PLk/L′k). From Lemma 2 (1), since the operator Op
only produces labelings that are compatible with all individuals’ labelings, then for every agent j
s.t. j 6= k: (LOp  j,|| L′Op iff LOp  j,|M| L′Op) i.e. Hamming distance based preferences and
IUO Hamming distance based preferences are equivalent for all agents other than agent k.
Now given Lemma 6, every strategic lie with the operator Op given IUO Hamming distance
based preferences is also a strategic lie given Hamming distance based preferences. However, all
those lies are benevolent for every agent j 6= k whether she has Hamming distance based prefer-
ences or IUO Hamming distance based preferences. Hence, every lie given IUO Hamming distance
based preferences is benevolent. 
Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with each indi-
vidual’s labeling. The following lemma shows that every strategic lie with the operator Op given
IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences is also a strategic lie given Issue-wise distance based
preferences. This lemma is crucial to show that the benevolence property of lies with the opera-
tor Op carries over from Issue-wise distance based preferences to IUO Issue-wise distance based
preferences.
Lemma 7. Let Op be a compatible operator. Let Lk denote the top preference labeling of agent k.
Let P be a profile where each agent submits her most preferred labeling, and let P′ = PLk/L′k be a
profile that results from P by changing Lk to L′k. Let LOp = OpAF(P) be the outcome when agent
k does not lie. Let Xk|MW| (resp. Xk|W|) be the set of all labelings L′Op that satisfy the following two
properties:
1. There exists some labeling L′k, L
′
Op = OpAF(PLk/L′k), and
2. L′Op k,|MW| LOp (resp. L′Op k,|W| LOp).
Then Xk|MW| ⊆ Xk|W|.
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Proof. This proof is similar to the one in Lemma 6. 
Theorem 13. Consider an operator Op that only produces labelings that are compatible (≈) with
each individual’s labeling. If all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have Issue-wise distance
based preferences then all strategic lies are benevolent when agents have IUO Issue-wise distance
based preferences.
Proof. This proof is similar to the one for Theorem 12, with the use of Lemma 2 (2) and Lemma
7. 
Observation 13. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof for neither Hamming
set nor Hamming distance based preferences. Consider the three labelings in Figure 12. Labeling
L1 of agent 1 when aggregated with L2 gives labeling L3, which disagrees with L1 on all three
arguments. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports labeling L2 instead, the result of the
aggregation is the same labeling L2, which differs only on two arguments {A,B}. The example is
valid for both Hamming set and Hamming distance based preferences.
Figure 12: The skeptical operator is not strategy proof.
Observation 14. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither Hamming set nor Hamming distance based preferences. See the example in Figure 13.
Labeling L2 of agent 2 when aggregated with L1 gives labeling LCO, which disagrees with L2
on the two arguments. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports L′2 instead, the result of
the aggregation is L′CO, which matches the labeling L2. This lie by agent 2 makes the agent with
labeling L1 worse off. The example is valid for both Hamming set and Hamming distance based
preferences.
Figure 13: The (super) credulous operator is not strategy proof.
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Theorem 14. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Hamming set based preferences.
For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. Let P be a profile, and L′k a strategic lie of agent k. Denote LSO = soAF(P) and L
′
SO =
soAF(PLk/L′k). Agent k’s preference is L
′
SO k LSO (i). We will show that for any agent i 6= k,
we have L′SO i LSO. Since the skeptical aggregation operator produces social outcomes that are
less or equally committed to all the individual labelings, we have that L′SO v Li for all i 6= k (ii).
Similarly, we have LSO v Lk (iii). From (i) and (iii), by Lemma 5, we have that LSO v L′SO (iv).
From (iv) and (ii) we have LSO vL′SO vLi for all i 6= k. Finally, we can apply Lemma 4 to obtain
L′SO i LSO for all i 6= k (v). We showed that a lie cannot be malicious, now we show that it is
benevolent.
(iii) implies undec(Lk)⊆ undec(LSO) (vi). (i) and (vi) imply ∃A∈ dec(Lk) : A∈ undec(LSO)∧
A ∈ dec(L′SO) (vii). From (vii), (ii) and (v) L′SO i LSO for i 6= k. 
Theorem 15. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Hamming distance based prefer-
ences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. Let P be a profile, and L′k a strategic lie of agent k whose most preferred labeling is Lk.
Denote LSO = soAF(P) and L′SO = soAF(PLk/L′k). We will show that, if L
′
SO is strictly preferred to
LSO by agent k, then it is also strictly preferred by any other agent. Without loss of generality we
can take agent j, j 6= k,whose most preferred labeling is L j.
Let us partition the arguments into the following disjoint groups:
• X= dec(LSO)\dec(L′SO) (decided arguments that became undecided).
• Y= dec(L′SO)\dec(LSO) (undecided arguments that became decided).
• Z= dec(L′SO)∩dec(LSO) (arguments decided in both labelings).
• V= undec(L′SO)∩undec(LSO) (arguments undecided in both labelings).
Labelings LSO and L′SO agree on the arguments in V (which are labeled undec) and Z (whose
arguments are labeled in or out). For the arguments in Z there are no in−out conflicts between
LSO and L′SO as the skeptical aggregation operator guarantees social outcomes less or equally
committed than L j. Therefore, only arguments from X and Y have an impact on the Hamming
distance.
Both labelings Lk and L j agree with LSO on the arguments in X because LSO decides on those
arguments and is less or equally committed than both labelings. On the other side, L′SO remains
undecided on the arguments in X so both labelings Lk and L j disagree with L′SO on X.
L′SO is less or equally committed than L j so, as above, we obtain that on the arguments in Y, L j
agrees with L′SO and disagrees with LSO. On the contrary, L
′
SO does not have to be less or equally
committed than Lk and so, for agent k, some of the arguments from Y increase the distance and
some of them decrease. If agent k prefersL′SO toLSO, then the number of the arguments decreasing
the distance must be greater than the number of those increasing by more than |X|. But for agent j
all the arguments from Y are decreasing the distance, as L j agrees with L′SO on the whole Y. So, if
agent k gains by switching to labeling L′SO, agent j needs to gain at least the same. 
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Observation 15. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof for neither Issue-wise set
nor Issue-wise distance based preferences. Consider the three labelings in Figure 14.11 Labeling
L1 of agent 1 when aggregated with L2 gives labeling L3, which disagrees with L1 on both of the
two issues. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports labeling L2 instead, the result of the
aggregation is the same labeling L2, which differs only on one issue {{A,B}}. The example is
valid for both Issue-wise set and Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Figure 14: The skeptical operator is not strategy proof. The set of arguments located in one box
form an issue.
Observation 16. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither Issue-wise set nor Issue-wise distance based preferences. In Figure 15,12 labeling L2 of
agent 2 when aggregated with L1 gives labeling LCO, which disagrees with L2 on the one and only
issue. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports L′2 instead, the result of the aggregation is
L′CO, which matches the labeling L2. This lie by agent 2 makes the agent with labeling L1 worse
off. The example is valid for both Issue-wise set and Issue-wise distance based preferences.
Figure 15: The (super) credulous operator is not strategy proof. The set of arguments located in
one box form an issue.
Theorem 16. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and Issue-wise distance based prefer-
ences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. Let P be a profile of labelings, and L′k be a strategic lie of agent k whose most preferred
labeling is Lk. Denote LSO = soAF(P) and L′SO = soAF(PLk/L′k). We show that if L
′
SO is strictly
11This figure is the same as Fig 12 with issues being evidenced.
12This figure is the same as Fig 13 with issues being evidenced.
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preferred by an agent k then it is also strictly preferred by any other agent. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can take agent j, j 6= k, whose most preferred labeling is L j.
Let Ide(L) (resp. Iun(L)) be the set of issues, each of which has arguments that are only decided
(resp. undecided) according to L. We call Ide(L) (resp. Iun(L)) a decided (resp. undecided) issue
(w.r.t L). Let us partition the issues into the following disjoint groups:
• X= Ide(LSO)\ Ide(L′SO) (decided issues that became undecided).
• Y= Ide(L′SO)\ Ide(LSO) (undecided issues that became decided).
• Z= Ide(LSO)∩ Ide(L′SO) (issues decided in both labelings).
• V= Iun(LSO)∩ Iun(L′SO) (issues undecided in both labelings).
The rest is similar to Theorem 15, but using issues instead of arguments. 
Theorem 17. The skeptical aggregation operator is strategy proof when individuals have IUO
Hamming sets based preferences.
Proof. Let P be a profile, Lk be the top preference of agent k, and L′k 6= Lk be any potential lie
that agent k might consider. Denote LSO = soAF(P) and L′SO = soAF(PLk/L′k). We will show that¬(L′SO k,M LSO). Which means, we need to show:
¬((L′SO k,M LSO)∧¬(LSO k,M L′SO)) (42)
¬(L′SO k,M LSO)∨ (LSO k,M L′SO) (43)
In other words:
¬((L′SOioLk ⊆ LSOioLk)∧ (L′SOduLk ⊆ LSOduLk))
∨(LSO k,M L′SO) (44)
To reformulate, we only need to show that one of the following holds:
1. ¬(L′SOioLk ⊆ LSOioLk), or
2. ¬(L′SOduLk ⊆ LSOduLk), or
3.
(a) LSOioLk ⊆ L′SOioLk, and
(b) LSOduLk ⊆ L′SOduLk.
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First, by definition, LSO is less or equally committed (v) than Lk. So, LSOioLk = /0, How-
ever, this is not the case for L′SO and Lk. So, L
′
SOio Lk might not be an empty set. Hence,
LSOio Lk ⊆ L′SOio Lk i.e. (3)(a) is satisfied. Now we show that either (1),(2) or (3)(b) is
satisfied.
Suppose (1) and (2) are violated and we will show that (3)(b) is then satisfied. This shows that
(1), (2), and (3)(b) cannot be all violated together.
Since (1) is violated and sinceLSOioLk = /0 thenL′SOioLk = /0 (i). Since (2) is violated then
∀a : (a∈L′SOduLk⇒ a∈LSOduLk) (ii). Note that ∀a : (a∈L′SOduLk⇒ (a∈ undec(L′SO)∧
a ∈ dec(Lk)))(iii). Otherwise, we would have a ∈ dec(L′SO)∧ a ∈ undec(Lk) and from (ii) we
would have a ∈ dec(LSO)∧a ∈ undec(Lk) which contradicts LSO v Lk.
From (i) and (iii), ∀a ∈ in(L′SO)⇒ a ∈ in(Lk) (iv) (from (i), Lk(a) 6= out, and from (iii),
Lk(a) 6= undec). Similarly, from (i) and (iii), ∀a ∈ out(L′SO)⇒ a ∈ out(Lk) (v). From (iv) and
(v), L′SO v Lk. Since ∀i 6= k: L′SO v Li, then ∀i ∈ Ag: L′SO v Li. By Theorem 1, L′SO v LSO.
Then, undec(LSO)⊆ undec(L′SO) (vi).
Now, ∀a∈LSOduLk then a∈ undec(LSO)∧a∈ dec(Lk). From (vi), a∈ undec(L′SO). Thus,
a ∈ L′SOduLk. Then, (3)(b) is satisfied. 
Observation 17. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof when individuals have
IUO Hamming distance based preferences. Consider the three labelings in Figure 16. Labeling
L1 of agent 1 when aggregated (using skeptical operator) with L2 gives labeling L3, which differs
from L1 on all five arguments with respect to dec− undec Hamming set. Then, L1
∣∣M∣∣L3 =
2×0+1×5 = 5. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports labeling L2 instead, the result
of the aggregation is the same labelingL2, which differs only on two arguments {A,B} with respect
to in−out Hamming set. Then, L1
∣∣M∣∣L2 = 2×2+1×0 = 4.
Figure 16: The skeptical operator is not strategy proof when agents have IUO Hamming distance
preferences.
Observation 18. The credulous (resp. super credulous) aggregation operator is not strategy proof
for neither IUO Hamming sets nor IUO Hamming distance based preferences. The example in
Figure 13 can serve as a counterexample for the case where individuals have IUO Hamming sets
(or IUO Hamming distance) based preferences. The agent with labeling L2 can insincerely report
L′2 to obtain her preferred labeling. This makes an agent with labeling L1 worse off.
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Proposition 9. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and IUO Hamming distance based
preferences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. From Theorem 15 and Theorem 12, the strategic lies are benevolent when individuals have
IUO Hamming distance based. 
Observation 19. The skeptical aggregation operator is not strategy proof when individuals have
IUO Issue-wise distance based preferences. Consider the three labelings in Figure 17.13 Labeling
L1 of agent 1 when aggregated (using skeptical operator) with L2 gives labeling L3, which differs
from L1 on all three issues with respect to dec− undec Issue-wise set. Then, L1
∣∣MW∣∣L3 =
2×0+1×3 = 3. But, when the agent strategically lies and reports labeling L2 instead, the result
of the aggregation is the same labeling L2, which differs only on one is {{A,B}} with respect to
in−out Issue-wise set. Then, L1
∣∣MW∣∣L2 = 2×1+1×0 = 2.
Figure 17: The skeptical operator is not strategy proof when agents have IUO Issue-wise distance
preferences. The set of arguments located in one box form an issue.
Observation 20. The credulous and super credulous aggregation operators are not strategy proof
when individuals have IUO Issue-wise sets (resp. distance) based preferences. The example in
Figure 15 can serve as a counter example for the case where individuals have IUO Issue-wise sets
(resp. distance) based preferences. The agent with labeling L2 can insincerely report L′2 to obtain
her preferred labeling. This makes an agent with labeling L1 worse off.
Proposition 10. Consider the skeptical aggregation operator and IUO Issue-wise distance based
preferences. For any agent, her strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. From Theorem 16 and Theorem , the strategic lies are benevolent when individuals have
IUO Issue-wise distance based. 
Theorem 18. Let F be the set of all possible classes of preferences, R be some set s.t. R ⊆ F,
and Ag be the set of agents. If an operator is strategy proof given that Ag have homogeneous
preferences from R, then it is strategy proof given that Ag have heterogeneous preferences from R.
13This figure is the same as Fig 16 with issues being evidenced.
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Proof. Let Op be an operator that is strategy proof given that Ag have homogeneous preferences
from R (i.e. ∀i, j ∈ Ag c(i) = c( j) ∈ R). Then, there exists no single agent j that has an incentive
to lie about her preferences (given that all agents have the same class of preferences). Note that
agent j has no incentive to lie given that the submitted labelings by all agents other than j are fixed.
Hence, the classes of preferences that are assumed for any agent k 6= j do not affect the incentive
of agent j to lie or otherwise. Thus, the same result would hold whether other agents’ preferences
are different from c( j) or not. 
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